Cyber event artifact investigation training in a virtual environment by Mims, Simone M & Wylkynsone, Tye R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items
2017-12
Cyber event artifact investigation training in a
virtual environment
Mims, Simone M; Wylkynsone, Tye R.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/56767
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.














Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
CYBER EVENT ARTIFACT INVESTIGATION 




Simone M. Mims 




Thesis Advisor:  J.D. Fulp 
Second Reader: Gurminder Singh 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB  
No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing 
instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection 
of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 
Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork 
Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY 
(Leave blank) 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2017 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
CYBER EVENT ARTIFACT INVESTIGATION TRAINING IN A VIRTUAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S) Simone M Mims and Tye R. Wylkynsone 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 




9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING AGENCY 
REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB number ____N/A____. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
The Internet has created many new technology advances that make everyday life easier and more 
efficient. However, technology has also enabled new attack capabilities and platforms that have the 
potential to cripple Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian information systems and cyber 
infrastructure. In order to minimize damages these threats could cause, the DOD needs well-trained 
operators and skilled cyber incident first responders at the helm. The first portion of this research focused 
on identifying operating system artifacts that give first responders the best information with which to 
identify if a cyber incident has occurred, or is occurring, and to determine the type of incident. 
The second portion of this research focused on developing virtual environments where students can 
participate in guided training and challenge labs. These labs can train system operators to recognize 
incident indicators and allow first responders to focus on collecting necessary information quickly. The 
Training Lab focuses on leading the student through an investigation of each designated artifact, while the 
Challenge Lab provides less guidance in order to test the students’ acquired skills. This partnered learning 
experience should lead to more proficient cyber incident reporting and should decrease the response delay 
between detection and recovery. 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  
cyber event investigation, CIRCE, operating system artifacts, incident first responder, CJCSM 
6501.01b 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
119 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii 




Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. 
 
 




Simone M. Mims 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Tulane University, 2011 
 
 
Tye R. Wylkynsone 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Marquette University, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 















Gurminder Singh, Ph.D.  




Peter Denning, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of Computer Science 
 iv 




The Internet has created many new technology advances that make everyday life 
easier and more efficient. However, technology has also enabled new attack capabilities 
and platforms that have the potential to cripple Department of Defense (DOD) and 
civilian information systems and cyber infrastructure. In order to minimize damages these 
threats could cause, the DOD needs well-trained operators and skilled cyber incident first 
responders at the helm. The first portion of this research focused on identifying operating 
system artifacts that give first responders the best information with which to identify if a 
cyber incident has occurred, or is occurring, and to determine the type of incident. 
The second portion of this research focused on developing virtual environments 
where students can participate in guided training and challenge labs. These labs can train 
system operators to recognize incident indicators and allow first responders to focus on 
collecting necessary information quickly. The Training Lab focuses on leading the 
student through an investigation of each designated artifact, while the Challenge Lab 
provides less guidance in order to test the students’ acquired skills. This partnered 
learning experience should lead to more proficient cyber incident reporting and should 
decrease the response delay between detection and recovery. 
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The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) defines an 
incident as “[the violation of an] explicit or implied security policy. This can include but 
is not limited to attempts to gain unauthorized access, unwanted disruption or denial of 
service, unauthorized use of a system for processing, or changes to system hardware or 
software without the owner’s instruction or consent” [1]. According to the Office of 
Management and Budget’s annual report to Congress, a report directed by the Federal 
Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, federal agencies reported over 69,851 
cyber incidents in FY14, 77,483 in FY15, and 30,899 in FY16 [2], [3]. Such a sizeable 
number of attacks per year presents a significant threat to the cyber architecture critical to 
the daily operations of Department of Defense (DOD), other government, and civilian 
enterprises. Though the fiscal year 2016 figures show that these attacks have decreased, 
there are still a significant number of attacks threatening these information systems (ISs). 
In order to minimize the damage these attacks could cause to United States ISs, system 
operators should be trained to recognize indicators that a cyber attack was either 
attempted or successfully committed. The first responder—or the first person notified of 
and who reacts to a suspicious event [4]—should possess the expertise to investigate and 
validate the indicator(s), and collect the necessary information needed to make a concise, 
informative, and timely initial report. This research developed hands-on lab experiences 
intended to increase an operator’s ability to recognize, categorize, and validate (or 
invalidate) computer-based and network-based indicators through analysis of readily 
available operating system artifacts [5], [6]. 
Within an organization, the individuals who interact with information systems fall 
into one of two general incident-handling roles: that of a detector or that of a responder. 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 6510.01B (subsequently referred to in 
this document as simply “CJCSM”) defines detectors as “people who observe an event or 
incident and are trained to step away from the affected system in order to ensure no 
damage or contamination of evidence” [6]. A detector is most likely the individual who 
first notices the indicators of a potential cyber event. These indicators can come from, 
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among other things, automated protection systems (i.e., alerts), user observation of 
system abnormalities, or external reports. Responders, on the other hand, are described as 
“the trained personnel who arrive to investigate and respond to a cyber-event or incident” 
[6]. A first responder is “the person who is designated within an organization to handle 
security incidents and determine their root cause” [4]. This research has developed hands-
on lab experience intended to enhance a detector’s ability to recognize one or more 
system events that are indicative of an incident, or are otherwise worthy of reporting. 
This experience should also train the first responder to more effectively validate and 
report incidents utilizing available operating system analysis tools and techniques. 
A. CJCSM FRAMEWORK  
The CJCSM 6510.01B was written and distributed in July of 2012. It focuses on 
establishing the guidelines, major processes, and required actions for the Department of 
Defense Cyber Incident Handling Program. The purpose of this program is to “ensure an 
integrated capability to continually improve the Department of Defense’s ability to 
rapidly identify and respond to cyber incidents that adversely affect DOD information 
networks and information systems” [6]. This program not only addresses cyber incidents 
(which convey a direct implication of malice), but also any cyber-related events that do 
not rise to the severity level of an incident, but nonetheless are useful in gaining and 
maintaining situational awareness regarding potential threats and vulnerabilities. For 
brevity, cyber incidents and reportable cyber events will be referred to as CIRCE 
throughout the remainder of this document. 
1. CJCSM Phases 
The Cyber Incident Handling program is broken down into the following six 
phases: 
1. Detection of event. 
2. Preliminary analysis and identification of incidents. 
3. Preliminary response actions. 
4. Incident analysis. 
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5. Response and recovery. 
6. Post-incident analysis. [6] 
 
As depicted by Figure 1, these 6 phases come together to serve as a framework 
encompassing all activities taken to promote prompt detection, timely reporting, and 
effective containment and recovery of an incident. This framework also facilitates 
damage minimization on information systems and networks, incident data preservation, 
coordination and communication across organizations, compilation of lessons learned, 
and the improvement of current defenses and strategies through pattern analysis [6]. 
 
Figure 1.  CJCSM Incident Management Process Life Cycle Model. Source: [7]. 
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2. Research Focus: Detection and Preliminary Analysis Phases 
The goal of the Detection Phase is to recognize all unusual activity, or events, that 
have the potential to degrade or harm the network or information system [6]. An 
organization should continually be in the Detection Phase of the lifecycle; as new CIRCE 
can occur at any time. Detection may be simultaneous with other ongoing investigations 
or processing no matter which phase they are in. 
Detection is critical. Neither the investigation nor the mitigation of an incident’s 
effects can even begin until a CIRCE has been detected. An effective detection capability 
within an organization is a direct result of guiding principles regarding what events are 
considered “normal” during the day-to-day operations of the system. By inference, then, 
any events falling outside of such a “normal” baseline should be subject to scrutiny. Such 
guidance should also be accompanied by appropriate training for the personnel assigned 
the tasks associated with the ongoing system event monitoring that is needed to detect 
deviations from “normal.” This training should include instruction on how to configure 
the monitoring tools/systems, as well as providing operator-level familiarity with such 
tools and systems.  
Detection of suspicious events can occur in multiple ways. Three methods 
outlined in the CJCSM 6501.01B are: 
1. An automated detection system or sensor. 
2. A report from an individual or user. 
3. An incident report or situational awareness update from other internal or 
external organizational components, such as USCYBERCOM or US-
CERT. [6] 
After detecting a suspicious event, first responders should make an initial 
notification to the appropriate external entities. The CJCSM 6501.01B, NIST Special 
Publication 800–61, as well as local written guidance are a few sources that can be 
utilized to guide proper notification procedures. The precise format of such notification 
will, in part, be driven by the classification of the system affected, the type of event that 
was detected, and the particular affected organization security policies in place. Cross-
domain coordination is key to ensuring all potentially affected entities can address the 
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issues as early on as possible. “An event cannot be determined to be an incident until 
some preliminary analysis is done to assess and validate the event against the criteria for 
determining if it is an event” [6]. Thus, first responders must move to the Preliminary 
Analysis Phase of the Incident Handling Model. 
In the Preliminary Analysis Phase, a first responder will conduct an initial 
analysis to determine whether the reported cyber event should be considered a CIRCE 
[6]. The first responder will review the following information, when available, and 
compare it to the organization’s incident criteria to make this determination: 
1. General description of the problem, event, or activity. 
2. Status (ongoing or ended; successful or unsuccessful). 
3. Number of ISs affected. 
4. Source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 
5. Source and destination ports. 
6. Hostname(s). 
7. IS location. 
8. User Information. 
9. Timestamps. 
10. IDS alert and payload data (if relevant). [6] 
Once the event is validated as a CIRCE, the first responder will assign that event 
to an incident category (Table 1), assign an initial impact assessment (Table 2), and begin 
or continue incident documentation. This documentation will include all known 
information about the incident and a detailed record of actions taken by the first 
responder. This will be helpful should the incident transfer to another responder for 
further analysis or investigation. During the Preliminary Analysis Phase, first responders 
will also make a determination if computer forensics should be conducted, and submit an 
initial report in accordance with CJCSM and NIST reporting format [5], [6]. 
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Table 1.   DOD Incident and Event Category. Adapted from [6]. 
  
Table 2.   Initial Impact Matrix. Adapted from [6]. 
 Cyber Incident and Reportable Cyber Event Category 
Network 
Device CAT 1 CAT 2 CAT 3 CAT 4 CAT 5 CAT 6 CAT 7 
Backbone High High Low High Low Low Low 





High High Low High Moderate Low Moderate 
Non-Public 
Server Moderate Moderate Low Moderate Moderate Low Moderate 
Public Server Low Low Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
Workstation Low Low Low Moderate Low Low Moderate 
 
3. Cyber Incident Report Format 
The CJCSM 6501.01B provides a standardized reporting format in order to ensure 
that incident reports are standardized across domains. Reports should be as accurate and 
meaningful as possible. They can be updated as the incident progresses and new or better 
(i.e., more accurate or detailed) information becomes available [6]. This information will 
flow simultaneously along two paths: the technical reporting channel and the operational 
reporting channel. Information that flows along the technical reporting channel will focus 
on actions taken to mitigate the CIRCE; while the operational channel keeps the chain of 
Category Description 
0 Training and Exercises 
1 Root Level Intrusion (Incident) 
2 User Level Intrusion (Incident) 
4 Denial of Service (Incident) 
7 Malicious Logic (Incident) 
3 Unsuccessful Activity Attempt 
(Event) 
5 Non-Compliance Activity(Event) 
6 Reconnaissance (Event) 
8 Investigating (Event) 
9 Explained Anomaly (Event) 
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command informed of the status of the event and the impact of the event on any current 
operations [6]. 
The Cyber Incident Report is broken down into eight sections: 
1. Cyber Incident Tracking Information 
2. Reporting Information 
3. Categorization Information 
4. Technical Details 
5. Sites Involved 
6. Impact Assessment 
7. Additional Reporting 
8. Other 
During Phases 2 and 3, a first responder should focus on generating a “quick” 
summary report rather than a complete and detailed report, which would be more 
appropriate following Phase 4. Given the “quick summary” nature of this early (phase) 
report, a responder should focus his/her initial efforts on information required for the 
following report sections: 
1. Reporting Information, 
2. Categorization Information, 
3. Technical Details, and 
4. Impact assessment. 
This provides the information needed to inform the correct personnel in the chain 
of command and get the right response actions in motion. Provided below is a brief 
description of what information should be placed into each relevant section of the report 
during the preliminary investigation. More detailed guidance is provided in Appendix B 
to Enclosure C of the CJCSM 6510.01B [6]. 
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a. Reporting Information 
This portion of the Cyber Incident Report provides the reader with information 
about the reporting unit. It also shows how to reach the organization’s point of contact for 
further information on the incident. 
b. Categorization Information 
This portion of the Cyber Incident Report provides the status of the incident or 
reportable event as well as the suspected delivery vector and system vulnerability that 
facilitated the incident. This section would include any actions taken by the first 
responder to analyze or mitigate the incident.  
c. Technical Details 
This section includes a description of the event or incident, as detailed as possible, 
as well as any identifying information gathered on who conducted the attack or from 
where the attack came. This information can include, but is not limited to, any identifying 
attributes of the attacking system, such as source socket pairs, country of origin, 
operating system, and exploits or tools used. This section should also include a list of any 
targeted IP and ports, the method of detection and a root cause determination, if known. 
d. Impact Assessment 
A first responder can complete an initial impact assessment even with a limited 
amount of information concerning the event [6]. This assessment should focus on giving 
the affected chain of command a snapshot of the operational effect of the incident. 
Information that can be included here, if known during Phase 2, includes affected 
systems, operational or technical impact and any known lost work hours. 
B. OPERATING SYSTEM ARTIFACTS 
Though no official definition exists, one may consider an operating system 
artifact to be any object or observable phenomenon that one may utilize to understand 
what has taken place on a system or network. These artifacts often comprise key 
“evidence” useful in discovering and understanding the pertinent details of what 
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malicious events/activities may have occurred on a particular system. Each operating 
system produces its own unique collection of system artifacts. Despite this, the artifacts 
of all operating systems can be generalized to just a few common types. This research 
focused on Windows systems and its particular collection of artifacts that are relatively 
easy for a responder to review. As shown in Figure 2, Windows is one of the most widely 
utilized desktop/laptop operating systems worldwide.  
 
Figure 2.  Operating System Usage. Adapted from [8]. 
Due to the widespread use of Windows computers, it is highly likely that an 
incident detector or responder will encounter a Windows system that will require digital 
investigation. Windows systems produce many artifacts. The virtual machine 
environments created for both the Training and Challenge Labs associated with this 
research employ the Windows XP operating system. Windows XP was the first Windows 
operating system (WinOS) to utilize the Windows NT (New Technology) file system. 
Though now one of the older WinOSs available, many of its basic characteristics are 
carried over into the newer WinOSs. The “[Windows NT] file system allowed for more 
Operating System Market Share Worldwide 
Windows OS X Unknown Linus Chrome OS FreeBSD
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in-depth analysis of the system” [9]. XP was the first version of the Windows operating 
system to utilize a prefetch file to improve the user experience. Since 2001, this prefetch 
file has been a pertinent source of information concerning a user’s normal computer 
habits [9]. XP also introduced logging functionality into the Windows operating system 
[10]. All subsequent versions of Windows are built upon these XP native functions. For 
these reasons, this research utilized the XP WinOS to assist students in developing a 
strong foundation for analysis that reasonably extrapolates to later Windows operating 
systems. 
This research suggests the following list of artifacts be considered for analysis 
during the Preliminary Analysis Phase of the Incident Handling Cycle. This list is based 
on the overlap of artifacts between the various artifact sources listed in Table 3, along 
with the emphasis of ensuring a timely and informative report. Due to this latter 
emphasis, we avoided any analysis method or technique that was advanced, specialized, 
or otherwise so complex that it would likely exceed the skills of the typical first 
responder, or take so long to accomplish that it would hinder a “timely” (quicker) initial 
report. 
1. Files 
2. Accounts  
3. Logs  
4. Network Connections  
5. Scheduled Tasks  
6. Users logged on  
7. Registry  
8. Processes 
 11 











Handling [4] CS4684 [11] 
Practical 
Windows 





LNK files Files Files Files File systems Files 
Open Files and 
full file system 
listing 
Prefetch files System Memory 
Current System 
uptime Tasks Scheduled Memory Scheduled tasks User login history 
Event logs Logs 
System and User 
Profile 




content Web Browsing Web and Email 
Network 
connections 













information Users logged on 
Routing table, 






Arp table, and 
DNS cache 

















Handling [4] CS4684 [11] 
Practical 
Windows 








DLL and Shared 
libraries Processes 
Registers and 


























II. VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT 
The constructed Training and Challenge Modules or Labs employ a device 
particularly well-suited for the job: virtual machines or VMs. One investigates artifacts 
on a computer running an operating system (OS) of some kind. A VM runs the same 
operating system code as a physical device and therefore delivers the same interactive 
experience as those physical machines. This VM can then be altered, saved, tested, and 
transmitted (i.e., shared). A VM thus facilitates multiple users being able to benefit from 
the learning environment and scenario that is captured by it. Indeed, this ability to have 
the essence of a computer in digital form set for use in a training laboratory is so useful, it 
is widely practiced. 
A. SETUP 
We chose to construct our VMs in the Naval Postgraduate School Cyber Battle 
Laboratory (CYBL). This lab’s collection of servers is remotely accessible and provides 
several templates from which to build multiple VMs based on multiple operating 
systems, as needed/desired. CYBL has several networks; some connect to the Internet, 
while others are isolated. Isolation serves to prevent any “adversarial” experiments (e.g., 
malware) from causing real damage by escaping the confines of the experimental 
environment. 
Among the VM choices are Kali Linux (Rolling Box) and several Windows 
versions with few patches, often having only the 1st Service Pack. We selected a WinOS 
VM for our Training and Challenge Labs, as this operating system is the most prevalent 
in United States Navy systems. We chose the Kali operating system for its pre-loaded 
Metasploit Framework (MSF). This toolset contains everything needed for us to step into 
the attacker’s role of exploiting the Windows VM. In so doing, we created all of the 
operating system artifacts we desired for our Training and Challenge Labs while acting as 




1. Training Lab 
The exploitation conducted for our Training Lab began by using a highly reliable 
vulnerability ms08_067_netapi [7]. This top choice among Windows exploits corrupts 
the stack and enables remote code execution. Although it is not new, many systems 
remain vulnerable to it. This vulnerability exists within a Simple Mail transfer program 
by Seattle Labs operating over port 139 and 445. Port 139 is NBT over IP, while port 445 
is for SMB (Server Message Block) over IP [7]. The capability granted to SMB and 
NetBIOS running over TCP/IP is undeniably powerful: one can obtain any piece of 
system data, no matter how well one may have hidden it. One can also write to the hard 
disk in a hidden manner. The intruder becomes indistinguishable from a legitimate user, 
apart from leaving artifacts indicative of malicious behavior. More information about this 
exploit can be found at the website provided in [15]. 
The command ‘service postgre start’, along with ‘msfdb init’ is necessary prior 
to running MSF. A database must be initialized and ready for use by MSF. These tasks 
are included in the MSF icon located on the sidebar of the Kali desktop, which is a time-
saving step. 
The MSF command ‘use’ selects the desired module. In this case, the command 
used was: ‘use exploit/windows/smb/ms08_067_netapi.’ SMB stands for the 
aforementioned Server Message Block. 
Actual offensive cyber operators will not clairvoyantly ‘know’ all the 
vulnerabilities for systems they target (or defend in the case of defensive cyber 
operators). Rather, they must perform vulnerability scans to discover if known 
vulnerabilities exist (whether they aim to exploit them, as offender, or to patch them, as 
defender). We already knew from course CY4710: Adversarial Cyberspace Operations 
that the netapi module should succeed against our target VM. Our target was loaded with 
a SLsmtp.exe from 2003 that allowed the powerful SMB exploit. 
Since the goal was to execute our own code, we also had to specify that to MSF 
by loading a payload. We choose a Meterpreter designed for Windows. The command 
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used was: ‘set payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp’. This powerful tool is 
designed to “land” (i.e., capture the CPU’s instruction pointer) within an existing process, 
which can then facilitate any one of a multitude of post-exploitation actions. It is also 
necessary to input required options in MSF that identify our target IP address and port 
before launching the exploit [7]. 
The command: ‘show options’ reveals all possible parameters for the chosen tool, 
and whether they are required or optional. Always required was the origin or Local Host, 
and the destination or Remote Host addresses. The commands used were: ‘set LHOST 
169.255.177.177’ and ‘set RHOST 169.255.197.17’ [7]. Of course, there were many 
other addresses used as this value needed to be set correctly whenever the network or 
target changed. We never employed an option to change the port, as the default of 445 
was ideal, should one find that port open; we ensured this was the case for our lab design. 
We desired the Training Lab to contain all categories of artifacts with an 
emphasis on overtness, in order to ensure numerous attack artifacts for discovery by the 
student learner. For example, we deliberately migrated Meterpreter to a non-existent 
process in order to create a process artifact. The command used was: ‘run 
post/windows/manage/migrate.’ The more attacker-savvy action would have been to 
migrate it into a stable process and remain unnoticed, but that would make it a more 
difficult/obscure artifact for the student learner to observe. 
We created a file that had an iconically suspicious name, badRAT.txt. We created 
a new user account named pwnedU, left this account logged-in, and elevated the 
account’s access by adding it to the Administrator group. The commands for that were: 
‘net user pwnedU /add’ and ‘net localgroup Administrators pwnedU /add.’ We 
scheduled outlandish tasks (LaunchTrojan.job), made blatant registry changes, left our 
network connections open, and left the application and system logs intact while deleting 
the security logs. 
Any attacker who desires to remain anonymous will put forth an effort not to 
leave behind so many clear indications of a compromise. However, realism in the 
scenario is traded for quantity of artifacts. Also, the training nature of this exercise calls 
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for some helpful markers on the artifacts. Because the environment is a virtual machine, 
it has all the components of a computer. Wading through the mass of data contained in, 
and manipulated by, a computer with the goal of identifying the suspicious data is a 
daunting task to the inexperienced. The flamboyant labels of a few select artifacts 
become conspicuously muted when tucked among tens or even hundreds of thousands of 
other benign ‘artifacts.’ This, in essence, becomes a search for a relatively small “signal” 
(attack-related artifacts) among a large backdrop of “noise” (non-attack-related artifacts).  
2. Challenge Lab 
The goal of the Challenge Lab is to have the student demonstrate proficiency as 
an Incident Responder under more realistic, less guided conditions. We consider that the 
discovery of even a few artifacts that lead to the verification of a CIRCE, along with 
accurate and informative entries in an incident report, represent a significant 
demonstration of proficiency lying at the core of what an incident responder is expected 
to be capable of doing. 
Accordingly, our Training Lab exploitation focused on process creation, leaving 
behind files tainted with malware, evidence of tampering with the Registry in highly 
suspect fashion, strange users with administrative privileges left logged-on, logs of 
attempted network connections, and system logs full of events representing our activities. 
These are needless breeches of covertness for a thorough compromise via a remotely 
running Meterpreter. 
The Challenge Lab, on the other hand, employed a stealthier demeanor to gain 
access to the system, to avoid purposely creating excessive artifacts. Armed with 
powerful Meterpreter access via netapi, the simulated intruder-injected malware is set to 
execute upon user (the student) activity. That malicious execution both creates artifacts, 
and serves as the abnormal system behavior cueing likely to be noticed by the system’s 
owner. This in-turn would result in the matter being brought to the attention of a first 
responder. As before, the student is expected to step into that role, investigate the 
artifacts, and report on the incident with minimal help. The skills learned and tools used 
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during the Training Lab should be sufficient for the student to be able to accomplish the 
Challenge Lab with no additional guidance. 
The setup for the Challenge Lab consisted of three stages: Pre-tasks, Stage 1, and 
Stage 2. Pre-tasks consisted of preparing the environment so that the planned exploitation 
in Stage 1 would occur in a continuous block with as few restarts as possible. Avoiding 
multiple exploitation sequences takes up less time, and creates artifacts that would be 
most likely/typical of an attacker who executed one intrusion. This was desired, vice a 
scenario consisting of a series of penetrations stretching over months of time, as was the 
case for the Training Lab. The result of a completed Stage 1, then, is the exploited system 
“template” to be used by the students. It represents a machine infected by malware that 
has yet to launch. Actions taken by the student will actually trigger the malware, and 
result in the various artifacts of interest (i.e., related to the attack) being generated. 
Finally, the purpose of Stage 2 was to test Stage 1 and allowed for alterations to ensure 
the Challenge Lab performed according to design. 
The first Pre-tasks step in preparing the Challenge Lab was to create another 
Windows XP virtual machine from the same template as the Training Lab. Next, a set of 
accounts was created using State names to follow the theme set by ‘Georgia.’ These 
included Arizona, Connecticut, Idaho, Mississippi, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. The intent 
was to create a more populated setting resembling a corporation. Here, one finds differing 
levels of permissions based on group membership. The next Pre-tasks step was to create 
groups and assign members to them, such as the standard administrators and users. 
Another group, the Executives, comprised the following user accounts: Nebraska and 
Wisconsin. The Executives have privileged access to the most valuable company 
property. 
This high-value property is the notional target of the Challenge Lab’s imaginary 
attacker. The next Pre-task step was to ‘create’ the ‘valuable items.’ A folder called 
‘Experiment Results’ was made to hold various important files that only the ‘Executives’ 
are authorized to access. 
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The storyline for the Challenge Lab reveals that the attacker was not able to 
exploit any executive directly, as they were all highly trained and security-conscious to 
present a soft target for the attacker. However, the attacker was able to access the rest of 
the system and scheme a plan. An executive would unwittingly copy the secrets to a 
location open to the attacker. Malicious scripts set in place by the attacker accomplished 
the information copying and exfiltration. The next Pre-tasks step was to build a repository 
called ‘Deleted Files’ that would look innocuous. This would hold the company secrets 
until they can be exfiltrated to a fictitious IP address controlled by the attacker.  
The next Pre-tasks step was script writing. The design for a multi-effect script was 
to accomplish the attacker’s goal. An ‘Executive’ logon action was set to trigger the 
script launch. This granted the script permission to access the Experiment results. The 
script next searched for content and copied it. The script then wrote into “Deleted Files” 
any content not already existing in that repository. Then the script attempted to exfiltrate 
the new repository contents to 196.254.33.45. This represented a location accessible to 
the attacker. RFC 3927 reserves the address range containing 196.254.33.45 for Link-
Local addressing [16]. Because it is not allowed to route a Link-Local address to the 
Internet, the attacker may only be using the 196.254.0.0/16 address as an intermediate 
step for subsequent exfiltration over the Internet [16]. Since the attacker already has some 
control over this other device in the local network, perhaps he/she also possesses direct 
access. Further investigation is required to determine what information, if any, left the 
network, when it left, and where it went. However, this type of in-depth analysis is 
beyond the scope of the Phase 2 analysis modeled in these labs. The final portion of the 
script deleted the account previously used by the attacker (Massachussets [sic]) at user 
log-off. 
The scripts utilize wscript.exe to run and this allows them to blend in with the 
Windows environment. Wscript is a native windows service whose purpose is to run 
VBScript files. When any script is run utilizing this Windows-based script host it will 
always appear in the process list or windows task manager as wscript.exe with no 
amplifying information on the script being run [17]. Therefore, the script being deployed 
by the service could actually be something malicious, such as a Trojan. This allows the 
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scripts to hide in plain sight among the scripts that are used for legitimate task, such as 
system administrator scripts for automating account set-up or printer sharing. The 
Challenge Lab imaginary attacker has done likewise. From a student evaluation 
perspective, it is considered acceptable that students simply notice this file as potentially 
suspicious, without them necessarily discovering the malicious scripts running from it. 
Other Pre-tasks steps enabled the smooth development of the virtual machine in a 
general sense, but did not relate specifically to the storyline. One of them was to enable 
the Windows logs, unlike the Training Lab where most logs were disabled. This was 
done through the Control Panel under Performance & Maintenance. There, Admin 
Tools, then Local Security Policies were selected. A window opened to allow changes to 
Policy and Audit settings of the WinOS Security logs. The following Security log audit 
functions were enabled based on what information was desired in the logs as well as best 
practices provided by Microsoft: 
1. Every Success or Failure for: Account Logon Events, Account 
Management, Directory Service Access, Logon Events, Object Access, 
Policy Change and Process Tracking 
2. Successful System Events 
3. Failed Privilege Use and Directory Service Access. [18] 
Another needed Pre-tasks step was to configure folder sharing between virtual 
machines. Only the Windows 7 VM had Internet access, a requirement in order to obtain 
the SysInternals Suite, as well as FPort and other tools provided for the Training Lab. 
These tools were then transferred to both the Challenge and Training Lab VMs via the 
aforementioned shared folder.  
Stage 1 was an enactment of the steps taken by the attacker that would result in 
the creation of the artifacts for later investigation by the student. To begin, the Metasploit 
framework to make three failed attempts to logon as Georgia. This simulated password 
brute forcing, or at least guessing, and started populating the logs with the first 
indications of something possibly wrong. A 4th attempt to login into Georgia succeeded. 
Next, the attacker now impersonated Georgia and created a user-level account 
named Massachussets [sic]. The purposeful misspelling was to evoke that this is a 
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questionable account, but only subtly so. Then, without severing the Georgia MSF 
Meterpreter intrusion, the attacker logged into the new Massachussets [sic] account. 
The attacker then attempted to breach the Executive-only folder holding the 
company secrets, as well as other protected objects. These all failed. Next, the attacker 
created the repository folder ‘Deleted Files’ with success since the users were permitted 
such action. 
Next, the attacker escalated the privileges of Massachussets [sic] to the Executive 
group level via MSF. Presumably, the attacker could have absconded with company 
secrets at that point, but the storyline is that the company might generate items that are 
even more valuable. Getting the latest versions of those new corporate secrets was the top 
aim of the attacker. To that end, the attacker implanted a prepared script into the 
Python2.7/Tools/Scripts folder. This location was another instance of hiding in plain 
sight. The attacker then set the script’s permission to execute. Finally, the attacker 
utilized a scheduled task to launch the implanted script upon logon of any Executive. The 
Challenge Lab instruction sheet guides the student to log-in as one of the Executive 
account to ensure the script launches. 
At this point in the VM development, a snapshot was made of the WinXP VM. 
This was to be the Challenge Lab deliverable: that point where the VM represented an 
infected system primed for anticipated discovery/detection and investigation action by the 
company employees (i.e., the student playing that role). All students fulfill the role of 
Georgia arriving at the next workday. 
Stage 2 comprised performing the entire Challenge Lab. Then we refined the 
scripts until the XP VM performed as expected. The snapshot was then ready for 
conversion into a template for students to replicate. 
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C. TRANSFER TO PORTABLE FORMAT 
A helpful trait of VMs is that they are transferred the same as any other multi-
Gigabyte-sized file. We extracted the Training Lab VM onto our external hard drives 
directly from the CYBL with the assistance of the technician maintaining it. By 
employing an .ova or .ovf format, these files can be opened anywhere with the use of 
software such as VMWare or VirtualBox. Due to their large size, direct downloading 
with modest-bandwidth available can be difficult. In this case, the VM size was nearly 
three gigabytes. Other options include hosting the file in the cloud or other file-sharing 
systems like Dropbox, or even using handheld portable media like flashdrives. 
For those with access to the CYBL, a more handy method of working with the 
VM was simply to create a copy of it from a template we provided. At NPS, the desired 
format is to use the CYBL, an in-house resource, especially when dealing with malware 
and exploitation or any other potentially malicious digital tradecraft that should be 
isolated from any operational public networks. Because the CYBL is accessible by web 
browser, anyone anywhere in the world with a CYBL account and VMware Horizon 
Client may replicate the Training Lab and Challenge Lab virtual machines templates for 
training or future research projects. 
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III. INVESTIGATION METHODOLOGY FOR ARTIFACTS 
While conducting the preliminary analysis, first responders should always be 
conscious of what their actions are doing to the system. Everyone should utilize a light 
touch when attempting to collect needed artifacts. Artifacts; i.e., the data collected during 
the preliminary investigation, can be broken into two categories: volatile and nonvolatile 
(or persistent) data. The category in which an artifact falls has a large impact on how and 
when a first responder collects them. 
Nonvolatile data encompasses the data that is unaffected when a system 
disconnects from its power source, whether intended or unintended. This data is generally 
stored on the system hard drive, or on removable media devices. Though this data is more 
stable than volatile data, it is critical to protect the integrity of this data throughout the 
incident handling lifecycle. This integrity is ensured through a well-defined chain-of-
custody practice that includes the generation and verification of hashes of the data as it 
moves through the lifecycle. Among the eight artifacts listed in Section B of Chapter I, 
five fall into this category: accounts, files, tasks, registry, and logs.  
Volatile data generally lives in system memory. Such data is likely to be lost 
when a machine disconnects from its power source, whether intended or unintended. One 
must collect this type of data on a live system before it is lost from memory [19]. Though 
this data is highly sensitive to system shutdown, there may be times when shutting down 
the system is the best action to prevent further damage to the network. Because this data 
is always in fluctuation and affected by system shutdown, a first responder must 
understand the risk of what may be lost in the case that a system shutdown is deemed the 
most prudent course of action. Among the eight artifacts in scope for the intended 
investigation level (i.e., Phase 2) of these labs, the following three artifacts fall into this 
category: running processes, users logged-on, and network connections. 
No matter what type of data one collects, setting a plan in place before an incident 
happens will ensure the best handling of the artifact data. This plan should include 
creation of a first responder tool kit, written guidance on what to consider an incident, 
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and how to handle and report each incident. Within the toolkit will be all the various tools 
needed to conduct proper system artifact analysis. Tools that are resident on the targeted 
system may have been subjected to adversarial tampering, and thus may not exhibit 
correct behavior when executed. Users or first responders may use such tools to conduct 
the initial investigation into suspect behavior on a system. However, once a CIRCE 
becomes known or suspected, these same tools may be considered unreliable, as their 
behavior may have been altered in conjunction with the attack. 
The following sections give a brief description of the artifacts suggested in 
Chapter I, explain which tools to utilize for their analysis, and suggest signs of malicious 
indicators to seek. 
A. PROCESSES 
1. Artifact Description  
A generic process description is, “the series of steps and decisions involved in the 
way work is completed” [20]. A process generally involves four basic elements: steps or 
decisions, variability of processing time or flow, timing and interdependence, and 
assignment of resources [20]. A computer process works in the same framework. In other 
words, computer processes are a set of instructions that are allocated some amount of 
central processing unit (CPU) resources [21]. A Windows process will consist of: 
1. A unique identifier called a process ID (PID for short)  
2. One or more threads of execution 
3. A private virtual address space 
4. An executable program  
5. A list of open handles to various system resources 
6. A security access token. [22] 
A process can also parent, or spawn, another process. This is an important fact as 
often times it may be normal to see a particular process with multiple instances. A good 
example of this is the process named Service Host Process, or svchost.exe. This is “a 
generic host process name for services that run from dynamic-link libraries. There are 
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generally multiple instances of this process in order to improve resiliency of a Windows 
system should one [instance] fail and to [facilitate] better performance overall” [23]. 
Once first responders understand the basics of a process, they should also ensure they 
recognize the baseline (i.e., normal) behavior of their system in order for this artifact to 
be useful. This can include, but is not limited to, understanding what programs are 
normally in use, what policies users should adhere to when using the system, and normal 
CPU workload. This information should be available to responders, as it would aid them 
in identifying those processes that seem abnormal and thus deserving of further scrutiny. 
2. Investigation Tools 
Often times, an easy start to understanding the processes running on a system can 
be accomplished through a quick Internet search. The Internet contains a wealth of 
information on what a process does, as well as which processes are often used by 
attackers. The Training Lab proposes three different tools for analyzing processes. 
The first tool suggested provides the simplest view of a running process. This is 
the Windows command tasklist. This command opens a command window to show a 
simple list of running processes. A useful argument to include when using this command 
is the argument /svc, which displays any service (svc) associated with the running 
processes. The second tool suggested is the task manager, which displays CPU utilization 
as well as running processes. Lastly, the Training Lab recommends the use of the 
SysInternals Suite tool PROCMON (meaning Process Monitor) to learn more information 
about any given process of interest. This information includes, but is not limited to, 
image path, process tree, PID, start and stop time, and owner of the process. 
Due to the method of exploitation used in creating the two labs, as described in 
Chapter II, the actual process used to exploit the system will no longer be running at the 
time a student is investigating the system. Consequently, the process is not visible when 
utilizing any of these tools. For the sake of instruction, the screenshot in Figure 3 was 
taken while the process was active in memory. Doing so provides the process tree that 
shows the actual rogue process to the student. This was done so as to edify the student 
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regarding what would have been visible in the case that this was a live, i.e., in-progress, 
exploit, vice one that has already terminated. 
 
Figure 3.  Process Monitor 3 Process Tree View 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious 
A good indicator that a rogue process, or one that is otherwise exhibiting unusual 
behavior, is running, is abnormally high resource consumption (i.e., bandwidth, 
processing or memory). One can view this information with the Windows Task Manger 
graphical user interface (GUI). First responders should avail themselves with any list the 
system owner may maintain that enumerates valid and typical processes, or any other 
such information gained from reviewing organizational guidance, and user interviews. 
With such information, they can then start to identify candidate processes that could be 
associated with, or responsible for, the suspicious activity. While utilizing the suggested 
tools, the student was further instructed to analyze a potentially suspicious process using 
the below queries listed in [24] to determine the legitimacy of that process. 
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1. Process’ Name 
2. Process’ Extension 
3. Location of Process’ Image (File) 
4. Process’ Parent 
5. Process’ Children 
6. Number of Process Instances 
7. Process’ User/Owner Account 
8. Process’ Start and Elapsed Time 
9. Process’ Command Line Arguments 
10. Process’ Base Priority 
11. Network Connections/Ports Created by Process 
12. Interesting Strings found in Process’ Image 
13. Process’ Current Execution Status 
14. Process’ Hash (as compared to known good reference) 
15. Process’ Existence When Not Expected (or opposite) 
16. Process’ Resource Utilization 
17. Files Opened and Privileges Thereof 
18. DLLs Loaded by Process  
19. Process’ Persistence [24] 
The suspicious process suggested in the Training Lab was an instance of 
SLsmtp.exe (or Seattle Lab simple mail transfer protocol). A quick Internet search of this 
process revealed that it is an extension of SLmail, which has multiple remotely 
exploitable buffer overflow vulnerabilities [25]. 
The Challenge Lab is configured to launch a malicious script in conjunction with 
a student’s log-in. Though such an artifice mimics what a real attacker may do, the 
purpose of this script in the lab environment was to ensure that an “interesting” process 
(to an investigator) runs despite the static nature of the VM that hosts the lab experience. 
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The Challenge Lab prompts students to identify the suspicious process on their own. The 
expectation is that the students will determine the legitimacy (or not) of the identified 
process based upon edifying information acquired from conducting the Training Lab. The 
scheduled task is set to launch the script every time the student logs in. This ensures the 
process will not disappear after the student has logged out. This demonstrates behavior of 
potential persistent malware, and allows the student ample time to analyze the process. 
4. Transition Signals 
Once a first responder identifies that a process has a high likelihood of being 
rogue, detecting this process at work on one’s system is a strong indicator that a CIRCE 
has occurred or is occurring. This should prompt first responders to evaluate the totality 
and bigger picture context of all of the information gathered thus far. If this evaluation 
reveals enough information to describe adequately the CIRCE, the first responders should 
terminate the Preliminary Analysis Phase, report their findings, and move into the 
Preliminary Response Phase actions. These actions may serve to contain or eradicate the 
rogue process, or—optionally—contain/limit any deleterious effects that may result if the 
responder decides to let the process continue to run. 
B. USERS LOGGED-ON 
1. Artifact Description 
The ‘users logged-on’ artifact focuses on identifying malicious users currently 
logged on the system. Skilled attackers will attempt to limit the amount of time they 
spend on a system in order to decrease the likelihood of detection. This would also entail 
limiting the amount of time they must be logged-on to the system. Nonetheless, the 
investigator would be remiss to not consider that the attacker may still be logged-on to 
the system being investigated. Consequently, they should check for this.  
It is best to use this artifact in conjunction with information discovered through 
investigation of other artifacts, such as logs and accounts. For instance, the first responder 
may discover in the security logs that an account was created or modified within the 
timeframe of the suspected CIRCE. If a user is currently logged on to this account, it 
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would be prudent to note which files this account is currently accessing or which 
processes this account attempts to run. 
2. Investigation Tools 
There are a few simple ways to view this artifact. For instance, query is a 
command line utility used to display the users currently logged-on locally to the system. 
The Training Lab leads students to utilize psloggedon.exe. This executable is a part of 
the Windows SysInternals Suite. This will not only display locally logged-on users, but 
also the remotely logged-on users, provided they are logged-on when the tool is run [26]. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious 
Analysis of users who are currently logged-on will tell first responders which 
users are potentially related to, or may be affected by, the suspected CIRCE. This artifact 
may also help establish a starting point for personnel interviews in order to narrow the 
scope of the incident. These interviews will help establish a collection of authorized user 
activity that can later serve to eliminate legitimate processes and valid user accounts from 
the preliminary investigation of logged-on users [27]. Upon identifying a suspicious 
account, if its user is currently logged-in, the first responder should quickly follow this 
lead, as this artifact is quite volatile. First responders should attempt to ascertain whether 
the suspicious account is locally or remotely connected, and what processes or services 
are currently in use by that account. In the Training Lab, the suspicious (i.e., attacker 
created) account is viewable from the login screen but will not appear when the student 
utilizes either of the suggested tools. This portion of the Training Lab demonstrates to the 
student that not every suggested artifact always bears fruit. In these cases, the student is 
reminded to not get stuck trying to make something appear. Instead, they should move on 
to more viable artifacts. 
After a student’s initial login to the Challenge Lab, the suspicious account will be 
listed as logged-on. However, once the implanted script runs, this account will be deleted 
and thus no longer viewable. Since there is no prescribed order to investigating the 
suggested artifacts, it is expected that some students may see this account, while others 
will not. This demonstrates the volatility of this artifact. In turn, this may lead to 
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discussion during classroom debriefing on why each student may have chosen a 
particular order when analyzing artifacts, and if that order helped or hindered their 
investigation.  
4. Transition Signals 
 This artifact alone will likely not be sufficient to discern definitively that a 
CIRCE has occurred. This is certainly true in the case where the attacker is not logged-on 
at the time the investigator looks at this artifact. It is also less useful—taken on its own—
when the users that are currently logged-on are known and trusted users. However, when 
coupled with logs, accounts, and process data, this information may provide enough 
evidence for transition into the reporting and Preliminary Response Action Phase of the 
incident handling lifecycle.  
C. SCHEDULED TASKS 
1. Artifact Description 
These tasks are instructions to the OS to run a chosen program in conjunction 
with some specified event. The attacker may have set up malicious activity that uses 
some event as a trigger. Scheduled tasks represent one overt way of doing this. One may 
consider scheduled tasks to be rather overt; i.e., sloppy attacker trade-craft, due to how 
readily they are located, as shown in the following tools section. However, the careful 
investigator should not omit checking for such evidence under the assumption that all 
attackers are skilled, or that—regardless of skill-level—they will never utilize a “blunt 
instrument” in pursuit of their goals. 
Time or logic bombs carry out functions similar to this category, but are much 
more covert artifacts. Despite the resemblance, they are not task-type artifacts. They 
nonetheless are worthy of mention as more sophisticated alternatives (to scheduled tasks) 
that first responders may encounter when dealing with correspondingly more advanced 
adversaries. 
Any task created by adversaries may indicate one of their goals for exploiting the 
system. The purpose for using a task is likely to launch malicious activity in combination 
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with some later, anticipated event [7]. A logical reason for such a one-two punch exploit 
is that the attacker deems these conditions optimal for his or her tailored attack. 
Furthermore, an attacker may seek different conditions for various phases of a 
complex attack. Optimal conditions for exfiltration may be sub-optimal (or worse) for 
intrusion or exploitation. There may be a security reason why an implant can be put in 
place most stealthily during a period of (relative) low-alertness. However, the attacker’s 
desired outcome may only be possible when a certain target group is active, which only 
happens after a maximum defensive condition is in place. An attacker may also want the 
desired attack timeframe to be well into the future so as to ensure he/she will be well 
clear of the ensuing aftermath. 
When scheduling Windows tasks, one may select a specific timeframe or a 
specific event to trigger the task. Triggering options include: during a startup, going idle, 
a workstation lock or unlock, a user session connection or disconnection, when some 
other task is created or modified, or a myriad of other system event types. A surface level 
look into the Windows 10 scheduling options reveals that there are over 360 different 
logs from which to choose a source and event ID in specifying exactly the desired event. 
A number of conditions and settings can also be applied to further tailor triggering 
conditions. The available complexity of the task-triggering prerequisites approaches that 
of a full-fledged logic-bomb. 
2. Investigating Tools 
Though there is always the option to use a native application, such as the 
Windows OS Task Scheduler, first responders would do well to employ a ‘light-touch’ to 
interact with a potentially compromised system. The SysInternals tool autoruns.exe is 
proposed for utilization during scheduled task analysis. Once this tool is opened, students 
are directed to click on the scheduled task tab to view any currently running or future-
scheduled tasks. A mediocre alternative is to gather this information from the command 
line command schtasks. This would avoid any problems caused by a corrupted Task 
Scheduler, but not by a corrupted cmd.exe. 
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3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious 
The task aspects of interest to first responders are rudimentary. Information the 
responder is likely to uncover can include: the action the task carries out, the author, the 
time of creation and any necessary privileges or requirements. The two labs present a 
simplistic environment for evaluating tasks, as there were only a handful of tasks 
configured into the lab VM. Among these, it is intended in the Training Lab that a first 
responder will recognize a task called LaunchTrojan.job as malicious. The same holds 
true for any task that runs a script that violates company policy. In fact, the actions these 
tasks specify serve as good indicators of the attacker’s overall goal/objective for that 
particular intrusion. Learning a task’s author or time of creation are no longer 
investigative priorities once the existence of such malicious intent (i.e., the explicit or 
implicit implication of a task’s action) has been discovered on a system. 
The situation magnifies when the number of tasks increase to levels one might 
encounter in a large enterprise system. There could be hundreds or thousands of tasks. 
Searching them singly would probably be futile, especially when there may be only one, 
or a few, malicious task(s) littered among the many legitimate tasks. Searching through 
logs is similar, and calls for narrowing the candidates by filters. One way to start is to 
arrange tasks by date and see which possess creation timestamps within a certain working 
attacker time-line, or time interval, that has been established from whatever suspicious 
activity has been gleaned so far in the investigation. A decision is required regarding 
whether to look at tasks dated earlier than the time of suspect activity detection, or to 
look at tasks dated later than that detection. This is driven by any sense the investigator 
may have regrading whether it was a task that caused the suspect activity, or whether an 
attacker may have created a task post-intrusion, perhaps to cause follow-on damage or to 
maintain access. If detection occurred very recently, one could simply work backwards 
from the present. The task list needs no further reduction when the investigator can scan 
every action or author therein in a few minutes. Autoruns.exe is an indispensable tool to 
help accomplish this feat, as it is capable of sorting task by date. 
In general, first responders should consider any task designed to start an activity 
that violates policy to be malicious. Activities matching this criterion would be those that 
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are unauthorized, criminal, capable of causing damage, or known as authored by an 
adversary. This latter example—authored by adversary—would be suspect for any task 
whose creation time coincides with that in which the adversary was logged on; or when 
all authorized users have been interviewed so as to rule out any task they made; thus 
leaving only suspect tasks. Such recognition will depend on the skill and experience of 
the first responders. They must pull together clues from other artifacts and work to obtain 
a strong understanding of what is and is not normal on the system under investigation. 
4. Transition Signals 
A task that is palpably malicious is clearly a mandate to notify appropriate 
personnel, and to either draft, or assist in the drafting of, an incident report. This task may 
be the primary vector or root cause for the exploitation, directly achieving the attacker’s 
goal. Alternatively, it could accomplish an adversary’s secondary purposes. Examples of 
secondary purposes include helping the attacker to maintain access, extending the main 
attack via lateral movement to other systems, or launching diversionary activities. In 
addition, such discovery will almost certainly happen after a set of other artifacts have 
been found and used as initial leads that led to the discovery of the task(s). 
The two labs created in this research such ‘palpably malicious’ sorts of tasks. 
There is little question that the tasks woven into these labs are intended to compromise 
the system and benefit the attacker: The Training Lab launches a Trojan, and the 
Challenge Lab runs a malware script to steal intellectual property. The difference 
between our lab examples and those likely to be encountered in a real-world enterprise 
scenario, is that the sparse artifact environment of our labs did not provide any cover for 
these already blatantly offensive tasks. Given this environment, then, a student can 
readily discover these tasks by searching for them right at the beginning of the lab. 
However, the storyline purports to lead them to the tasks in a manner that is more typical 
of a real-world scenario. As one of the non-volatile artifacts that may need some cross-
referenced data (clues), it is placed, i.e. brought to the attention of the student, towards 
the latter part of the Training Lab investigation. 
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There is prudence in noting that the task activates a Trojan or script that attacks 
the company secrets. However, trying to get further details into the Trojan or script 
mechanisms is a delay that the first responder should avoid. If a task was in a grey, 
questionable status that aroused suspicion, this could be noted for follow-up, but should 
not hold up the search for further, more conclusive, evidence of an incident. A premature 
transition could result in a false-positive report, or may lead the first responder to 
overlook other artifacts of interest that might have otherwise been discovered shortly 
thereafter. 
D. ACCOUNTS  
1. Artifact Description 
An account is a collection of permissions and settings. An operating system uses 
it to grant resources to any persona (human or system) able to successfully authenticate 
for a particular account. Should an adversary have physical access to a system, he/she 
may be able bypass the account system to gain unauthorized access to it. However, under 
the more likely scenario, involving remote access to a system, one encounters the 
operating system. One of the jobs of an OS is to manage the allocation of system 
resources and objects (e.g., directories and files) to the requesting subjects in a manner 
that adheres to an access control policy. Accounts are the basic mechanism by which an 
OS can assess whether such requests are granted or not. As such, accounts play a pivotal 
role in the overall security posture of any automated systems. 
Subverting the access controls facilitated by accounts is the desired outcome for 
several malicious feats: privilege escalation, credential theft, rogue account creation, or 
even the obtainment of direct physical access to the system, if/when such direct access 
averts the need for account authorization. If an attacker cannot obtain a legitimate 
account credential, or otherwise subvert the OS to bypass its access control mechanism, 
he/she will not obtain logical access to the targeted system objects. Lack of such access 
renders subsequent attack objectives (e.g., file theft/exfiltration) attacks infeasible. An 
attacker must solve this security obstacle early on. 
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The artifact aspect of an account is rather straightforward: is the account itself, or 
one or more of its permissions/privileges fraudulent? Answering these questions is the 
essence of the analysis of this artifact. The system actions (i.e., processes executed or 
attempted executions) initiated by an account is the primary way to determine if an 
adversary used it. Besides specific malicious actions taken under a particular account, the 
investigator should also look for the simple existence of accounts—particularly admin-
level or higher—that are not recognized as legitimate by the system’s authorized 
owner/operator. 
2. Investigation Tools 
A single tool is proposed for analysis of WinOS accounts: net [user]. There is a 
family of commands under net that can disclose group membership. There are also 
several management operations. The intrinsic characteristics of accounts are simple 
enough for one tool to reveal them: 
1. The name of the account. 
2. Who created the account? 
3. When was the account created? 
4. What privileges are granted to the account? 
5. To which group(s) does the account belong? 
6. When was the account added to those groups? 
7. When was the account deleted, and by whom? 
The onus is on the investigator to put the account into context. None of the 
answers to these questions provide automatic proof of something malicious in and of 
themselves. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious 
Despite the possibility that an account may appear completely legit, an account 
may be suspicious simply by existing. Accounts pertaining to; former employees, 
deceased or fictitious persons, corporate competitors, a known bad actor, or anything else 
that is otherwise nonsensical, are highly suspicious. Also suspicious is the creating of 
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accounts outside of normal work hours. Any account which gained access to an otherwise 
“closed” or privileged group, such as an eighth member of a strictly seven-member 
board, is a likely a red-flag indicator of foul play. 
The Training Lab account pwnedU is an example of a blatantly suspicious 
account. The purpose of that account was to pretext the detection at the beginning of the 
Training Lab. This triggers students to begin their initial first responder actions. 
Such account artifacts could be attempts at self-concealment, as when using an 
impossible identity. An account associate with a nonexistent employee or a person who is 
deceased are examples of an impossible identity. Whatever the motivation or cause, these 
artifacts serve the first responder by presenting indicators of a security breach. Pursuing 
the genuine identity of a false account is a matter for data forensics. 
The Challenge Lab account “Massachussets [sic]” blends in among a slightly 
more developed environment. Here, there were several legit accounts, which all have 
U.S. state names. Some of the accounts have a special group membership called 
“Executive.” After having learned this group had access to the targeted company secrets, 
the adversary created an imposter account with the misspelled name “Massachussets 
[sic].” This account was elevated to an administrator account, which grants privileged 
access to modify the system. 
4. Transition Signals 
The Training Lab pwnedU account was designed to be the detection trigger. Per 
the storyline, this trigger was utilized to move the student from the role of an employee or 
helpful sysadmin, to the role of investigator or first responder. Even a rather superficial 
(surface-level) investigation of this account would show that the account privileges were 
escalated to administrator. On its own, discovery of pwnedU is sufficient to declare a 
CIRCE per the CJCSM. If this artifact were created by an adversary, then a first 
responder stopping upon discovery of the account precludes him or her from any 
knowledge of what the adversary did besides gain access. This could be the sole item in 
the CIRCE report. Yet, without knowing what the intruder has done, it is not possible to 
determine what specific damage or adverse impact to the system has resulted from the 
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intrusion. Local guidance may prioritize a speedy initial report or it may encourage the 
responders to continue several more minutes if they expect it will be fruitful. 
The Challenge Lab’s Massachussets [sic] account; similarly, does not possess any 
basic attributes that would immediately signal transition. At first glance, it looks like yet 
another routine user account created by administrator Georgia that has followed the basic 
naming convention established by the company. However, the fact that it was created so 
much later than the other accounts (abnormal), so quickly escalated to an administrator 
(abnormal), and, especially, that it joined the ‘Executives’ should concern first 
responders. Additionally, administrator accounts should not just “appear” without the 
concomitant formality and publicity that one would expect surrounding the creation of 
such a privileged user. Discovering that Georgia was compromised, and either of the two 
facts that Massachussets [sic] 1) took company secrets or 2) uploaded a script to automate 
that process; ought to quell any doubt that Massachussets [sic] is indeed a malicious 
account-based artifact. 
E. REGISTRY 
1. Artifact Description 
Registries are logically organized collections of attribute-value pairings that 
support as the multitude of system configurations that an OS requires for proper 
functioning. Registries provide a treasure trove of potential system-wide artifacts that are 
of use to an investigator information; but it could also take a person an interminably long 
time to dig out all such digital evidence from these intricate data structures. This artifact 
merits investigation with caution as unintentional changes to these values could cause 
user-level or system-level malfunction or breakdown [17]. For the WinOS, information 
such as application configuration data, system configuration changes, removable media 
utilization, wireless connection settings, and passcodes, are all stashed in the Windows 
Registry. Each can be very helpful to first responders if they know where to look.  
The Registry divides into multiple system-specific and user-specific divisions 
called “hives.” Each hive consists of three components: keys, values, and data. The 
Incident Response and Computer Forensic book compares these components to that of a 
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file system; where a key could be thought of as the directory path, values as the filename, 
and data as the file contents [14]. The main five registries of the system are SAM, 
SECURITY, HARDWARE, SOFTWARE an SYSTEM. The five major hives are located 
in %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config and two user-specific hives are located in the 
user’s profile directory. When the system is running, Windows maps the contents of the 
hives into a tree structure that begins with a set of root keys. In turn, these further divide 
into subkeys, which represent the hive files. These root keys are a good place for first 
responders to begin investigating the Registry [14]. The following list describes what 
information is stored in each root registry key: 
1. HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT (HKCR)—This hive stores information about 
drag-and-drop rules, program shortcuts, the user interface, and related 
items. 
2. HKEY_CURRENT_USER (HKCU)—This hive is very important to any 
forensic investigation. It stores information about the currently logged-on 
user, including desktop settings, user folders, and so forth. 
3. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE (HKLM)—This hive can also be important 
to a forensic investigation. It contains those settings common to the entire 
machine, regardless of the individual user. 
4. HKEY_USERS (HKU)—This hive is likely to be critical to forensic 
investigations. It has profiles for all the users, including their settings. 
5. HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG (HCU)—This hive contains the current 
system configuration. This might also prove useful in your forensic 
examinations. [14] 
2. Investigation Tools 
A listing of Registry data can be obtained from a command prompt window with 
the reg query command. Since not all Registry data is human-readable, two SysInternals 
Suite investigation tools are suggested to the student. The first is autoruns, which 
displays the desired registry keys data value if the value is set. From there, students can 
navigate to the Windows Registry editor, regedit.exe. This program allows students to 
view a desired key’s location in the registry along with any information that has been 
stored in the various hive components. Simply starting in the Registry editor may not 
always be the best course of action as there can be an overwhelming amount of 
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information to navigate through. A more surgical approach of pairing these two tools will 
help to focus the first responders’ Registry investigation, in addition to saving time. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious 
Unexpected key values or data in the registry, or changes to known values, are 
strong indicators that system tampering may have occurred. Changes to the registry can 
result in system crashes or abnormal behavior, which are also indicators of suspicious 
activity. In the Training Lab, there are no intentional changes in the registry. There are; 
however, indications of the creation of the suspect user’s account and its permission 
elevation. There is no information about the attacker’s actions available in the registry 
that has not already been identified by other artifacts. 
The Training Lab focuses on developing students’ basic understanding of how the 
WinOS Registry is structured and on presenting some easy-to-follow guidelines on how 
to conduct a surface-level analysis of them. Students leverage these skills and 
information during the Challenge Lab. In order to ensure students are ready to inspect the 
Registry in the Challenge Lab, students perform a guided examination of the registry in 
the Training Lab. 
The req query command lists the details of each of the five hives. Autoruns and 
regeditor allow for investigation of system registry keys that were utilized to run a task; 
i.e., the Run, RunOnce, and AutoRuns keys. These could provide useful information to 
ascertain the attacker’s objective or behaviors. The Challenge Lab utilizes the keys 
mentioned above to ascertain whether the attacker implemented some manner of 
persistence for his/her attack script. 
4. Transition Signals 
The registry is attractive to the attacker for a few reasons. First, the amount of 
system-generated “noise” (i.e., all of the “normal” events generated) that an investigator 
must sift through in order to find useful artifacts that are directly linked to an attacker’s 
behavior is substantial. The system is constantly producing registry changes in support of 
numerous events occurring on a normal basis. This noise allows the attacker to hide 
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virtually in plain sight. Furthermore, the attacker can take advantage of the registries’ 
unique ability to run a program, without requiring the attacker to implant a file or 
schedule a task. This allows the attacker to achieve persistence for his/her attack, along 
with a degree of stealth. Alternatively, the attacker could achieve certain objectives 
without having to add anything to the Registry; but rather, could simply modify or delete 
a small portion of the registry to achieve the desired system behavior. For instance, if the 
attacker’s goal was to simply degrade the target’s ability to use the system (i.e., 
degrade/deny service availability) a small change in the Registry could achieve this goal, 
and may be quite difficult for the system administrator to diagnose and correct.  
Unexpected programs, previously identified interesting strings, or unknown 
executables listed in key values are candidate signals that could prompt the first 
responder to declare CIRCE detection, and to thus transition to the next phase of the 
incident lifecycle. Due to the size and complexity of the Registry, along with the typical 
level of Registry knowledge expected from an individual serving in the first responder 
role (vice digital forensics analyst), the depth of analysis may be insufficient to justify the 
declaration of CIRCE detection even though there may be abnormal indicators 
discovered. First responders should keep in mind that Registry hunts can become a very 
time-consuming endeavor. If the suggested surface-level analysis does not reveal enough 
information to understand what is happening, the first responder should annotate the 
finding and attempt to correlate with another artifact to get to a transition point. Phases 4 
and 5 of the incident handling lifecycle will allow for deeper analysis of the registry keys 
and annotated evidence.  
F. FILES 
1. Artifact Description 
Files are the means to store data for a computer or information system. They are 
part of the routine landscape in the cyber domain. When an adversary creates on, uploads 
to, or downloads from, a file on a system, it is done so as to achieve, or help to achieve 
some malicious objective. A file also becomes an artifact when an adversary leaves upon 
it any trace of his/her interaction with it. Perhaps they stole information, read sensitive 
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information, altered a file, or embedded an alternate data stream into it. Investigation of 
particular files can help first responders build a picture of an attacker’s activities. Link 
files, Prefetch files, and files found in the Recycle Bin are examples of files that reflect 
recent file-related activities [14]. A brief description of these files is provided below.  
‘Deleting’ files does not mean one immediately removes them from the system. 
The files’ index, or memory address, in the file directory system, is flagged in the system 
as available space, even though the ‘deleted’ data still exists at that location. ‘Deleted’ 
files are copied to the Recycle Bin. As their former storage locations on the hard drive are 
overwritten, they become progressively unrecoverable from those original locations. It is 
possible that an attacker has deleted files that could reveal either his/her direct activities, 
or be indicative of his/her ultimate objectives on the system. It may be possible to recover 
these files either from the Recycle Bin or from disk space formerly allocated to the file 
folder [12].  
Link (LNK) Files, “act as pointers to other files or folders on a system and are 
used to create a direct link to an executable file instead of requiring navigation to the file 
directory” [14]. The location of these files will differ based on operating system (OS) 
version. In the Windows XP OS, utilized to build the virtual environment, the link files 
reside in C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\ and 
C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Office\Recent\. The link files 
provide the following information: 
1. Full file path (at the time the link was created) 
2. Network share name (if target file originated from such a source) 
3. Serial number for the source volume 
4. Attributes and logical size 
5. Standard Information Modified, Accessed, and Created timestamps for the 
referenced file at the time it was last opened. 
6. A unique object identifier (ObjectID), also stored in the target file’s 
Master File Table (MFT) record and used by the Distributed Link 
Tracking service. [14] 
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A prefetch file exists for each executable and is stored at SystemRoot\Prefetch. 
As described in a previous section, this file design speeds up system performance and 
will generally contain the most recently utilized Dynamically-linked libraries (DLL). 
Along with the most recently utilized DLLs, the prefetch file will contain the following 
information for up to 128 executed programs: 
1. The executable’s name 
2. The path to the executable 
3. The number of times that the program ran within the system 
4. The last run time 
5. A list of DLLs used by the program [12] 
Time or logic bombs, previously mentioned in Section C, are another example of 
a file artifact. In general, a logic bomb is a malicious code/file inserted into the system 
that checks for a particular condition, or set of conditions, before executing some 
attacker-defined actions. Time bombs work in much the same way, but rather than 
waiting on any number of general system conditions (as does a logic bomb), it is set to 
activate on a particular date and time. Though first responders would definitely want to 
find/identify any such files, actual analysis of them should wait until the Analysis Phase. 
When being analyzed, it is good practice to do so in a sandbox environment. This is a 
precaution to prevent further system damage should the file “detonate” upon some built-
in logic that detects tampering or discovery. 
2. Investigation Tools 
A file integrity checker is a great tool to have in place on your systems. These 
tools offer a time-efficient way to track changes made to files and file permissions. When 
no file checker is in place, timestamps of files are another good indicator to check when 
attempting to identify signs of malicious files, or signs of tampering with legitimate files. 
The Windows file system is organized in a hierarchical structure that makes it easy to 
search for and view the files and directories it contains. 
The MFT is another feature of the Windows file system, which provides a view of 
the metadata associated with each file. Metadata stored in the MFT is helpful for quickly 
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gathering file-identifying information; such as name, timestamps, location, and even data 
if the file is small enough, i.e., less than 512 bytes. [19]. Utilizing the search function of 
Windows allows first responders to sort by date or file type, such as .lnk files, and 
thereby narrow their file search space.  
A .pf reading tool, such as WinPerfectview, opens Prefetch files in a human-
readable format. One recovers deleted information through examination or restoration of 
Recycle Bin files (whether viewable or hidden), or with an imager such as AccessData 
FTK [12]. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious  
Indications of malicious behavior concerning files can include file creation, file 
modification, or file deletion. This artifact is more valuable to the investigator when it is 
considered in the context of written guidance for system usage and user interviews; as 
these help establish a baseline of “normal” against which abnormalities are more likely to 
be noticed. First responders should also be suspicious of any unusually named files. In 
the Training Lab, the suspiciously named file badRAT.txt is hidden in the system32 
directory. 
In the Training Lab, the student is prompted to leverage information learned about 
an already identified CIRCE to identify suspicious files through a combination of time-
scoping and a simple Windows search of all files. Even though over 30,000 files exist on 
the system, most of them ought to have been temporarily removed from the investigation 
platter. The account suspected of creating badRAT.txt was itself created in recent 
months, but most files on the system have a much older creation date. That file’s name 
and metadata act as signals that the file is potentially malicious, or foreign to the system. 
In the Challenge Lab, the attacker did not merely implant a file in the directory, 
but also attempted to exfiltrate data. The student is expected to again scope the incident 
based on already gathered evidence, such as time evidence found via the accounts or logs 
artifacts. From there, students are to trace the attacker’s movement through the file 
system. Metadata and timestamps are the key elements to this analysis. 
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4. Transition Signals 
Depending on what is discovered in the file system, this artifact alone may not be 
enough to signal transition. For instance, a newly created file may, depending on other 
contextual factors, warrant further investigation; even though its existence could be 
benign. Unless an unauthorized, or authorized but hijacked, account created the file, this 
rather routine file-creation event certainly does not warrant transition. However, the 
discovery of a known malicious or suspiciously-named executable file would likely 
warrant transition no matter who authored it, or when that occurred. Given the potential 
danger that exists with malicious executable files, we expect the student, acting in the 
capacity of a Phase 1 (Detection) investigator, merely to find/notice suspicious files, not 
to actually analyze them. Actual analysis is left to more advanced responders (e.g., 
forensics and/or malware analysts) who have the specialized training and tools needed to 
do so. This artifact becomes stronger by correlation with other system artifacts. 
G. LOGS 
1. Artifact Description 
Numerous logs record events on a host machine daily. In the case of a Windows 
OS, the three main, or core, logs are Application, Security and System. Each is a great 
tool for rebuilding the history of what took place during a suspected incident. The 
Security log records events that reveal attempts to enter the system, such as login 
attempts, and logouts. The Application log records events relating to specific application 
processes running on the system. The System log records information that pertain to 
system-wide events, such as kernel operations, power management, disk drives, time, and 
other services that always run as part of the basic “infrastructure” of the system. All of 
these are recorded and ranked on a three-tiered priority scale. On this scale, the lowest 
priority is information, the middle priority is warning, and errors are at the top of the 
priority scale. 
Based on how the logs are configured in a system and the volume of events 
generated, there could be hundreds of thousands of logged events to sift through. 
Utilizing information and leads gleaned from the inspection and consideration of other 
 45 
incident-related artifacts, one can significantly narrow the log search space to only what 
is likely to be related to the suspect CIRCE. Indeed, this tactic is suggested to the 
students. By focusing their investigation of the logs into a particular time period, an 
otherwise intimidating quantity of log data begins to narrow to a manageable level. 
Unusual events can also be great indicators of where one should look next. A blank log 
period could imply deletion of existing logs, or disabling of logging. In either case, these 
are fairly reliable indicators of malicious activity. Any such unexpected changes in the 
status of system logs can help an investigator establish a timeframe for when the attack 
occurred. In their absence, these artifacts could signify an attacker’s desire to hide his/her 
activity on the system.  
2. Investigation Tools 
The first tool suggested for searching logs is Windows Event Viewer, accessed by 
typing eventvwr.msc into a command prompt window. This is a standard component of 
the Windows OS. It opens in a pop-up window and presents a graphical user interface 
consistent with the Windows environment. It provides access to the three core Windows 
logs already mentioned, along with two specialty logs named ‘setup’ and ‘forwarded 
events.’ Logs created by any add-on (i.e., not a native part of the OS) programs installed 
on the system may be observed with the Windows Event Viewer. There is also the 
‘administrative event’ custom view, which shows a superset of the core logs by 
combining events from any source log. Naval Postgraduate School users can also utilize 
the Windows Event Viewer to view logs created by activity association with the virtual 
private network used to tunnel onto the school’s intranet. 
Despite the high quantity of events logged, Event Viewer is a tool with which all 
beginning incident handlers should become familiar. As the Windows Event Viewer 
exists on every Windows system, it is reasonable to assume it will always be available to 
view desired log entries. However, the fact that it is a native windows program does not 
mean the viewer is incapable of being corrupted. This tool is simply suggested as a likely 
starting point when attempting to find event “needles” of investigative utility from among 
the “haystack” of all the system events recorded in the logs.  
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The Training Lab next suggests the log tool PSloglist, a SysInternals Suite 
command-line tool. It allows one to view log data in a human-readable output, or to 
dump logs into a plaintext (Excel) file for a searchable review capability. This tool carries 
the advantage of being useable in a read-only, off-system manner, as part of a forensic 
workbench, or more simply a CD-ROM. When employed in such a ‘light-touch’ manner, 
PSloglist reads the target system without changing it. Thus, any forensic image of the 
target machine obtained after viewing its logs using PSloglist remains faithful to the state 
of the machine prior to such viewing. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious  
Several broad indicators are suggested during the lab, including failed log-on 
attempts, startup or termination of services, remote connections, created or deleted 
accounts, startup or termination of processes. As previously noted, when expected log 
entries are not present, it is likely the result of a human act. The events themselves may 
have been suppressed, the logs may have been altered, or the audit policy may have been 
changed. The ability to detect log aberrations requires a thorough sense of what ‘normal’ 
looks like in a system, or at least that part of the system covered by a particular log. 
Developing such a keen sense is a product of more time and experience than a 
laboratory setting can impart. The labs acknowledge this aspect of how best to use logs. 
However, there was no deliberate altering of logs, whether pinpoint changes or entire log 
deletions. 
The Training Lab VM has very few logs enabled. Nevertheless, there are a few 
interesting log-based artifacts for the students to view which correlate to other types of 
artifacts found in the lab. The creation of the pwnedU account was discoverable on the 
date 17AUG17. The creation of badRAT.txt was also recorded, on the earlier date of 
10AUG17. Although the existence of both artifacts should have been previously noted by 
the students, it is (likely) only after log artifact review that they learn that the suspected 
Trojan predates the pwnedU account by one week. This is a clue that adversarial activity 
began before making pwnedU an administrator. The application log events also indicate 
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the times that the remote connection manager started and stopped, and these times 
coincide with the attacker’s activity on the system.  
The other notable log artifacts are indicative of a prominent amount of activity by 
one program beyond the all others: SLadmin. If this program is unknown, an investigator 
can easily research it, or request such from more advanced forensic analysts. If 
researched sufficiently, one would find that its flaws were exploited by malware. 
However, this exploitation was done as a part of instrumenting the lab so that the lab 
exhibits the sort of artifacts expected of an attacked system. The student is not expected 
to conduct the more advanced malware analysis that would reveal the details of this 
exploitation.  
The Training Lab demonstrates that all these events were already introduced and a 
CIRCE should have already been declared. Accordingly, the storyline uses them as 
amplifying information suitable for following up with a simulated initial incident report. 
A change was made in the Challenge Lab VM’s audit policy to enable the security 
logs. The goal was to provide an abundant amount of information for the students to 
narrow down via well-chosen filters. Unlike the Training Lab, the exploitation in the 
Challenge Lab follows a planned and scripted single-episode intrusion for the students to 
investigate. By narrowing investigative scope down to either the actor 
‘Massachussets’[sic], or the right time period; it is desired that the students piece together 
a portion of the attacker’s activity. Because the Challenge Lab allows students free-range 
regarding which artifacts they pursue, and which leads they follow, it is left up to them 
whether to search the logs earlier in their investigations, or later. If later, they may have 
already determined what incident occurred and may have only sought corroborating 
evidence to add detail to their reports. 
The following log artifacts are available in the Challenge Lab: failed attempts to 
logon on as Georgia, the creation of an Executive account much later than the others, 
failed access attempts to restricted folders, followed by successful attempts of those 
folders, copying of data from the ‘Experiment Results folder, the creation and injection of 
a malicious script, that fact that launching of that script coincides with the user’s logon, 
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and unsuccessful network connection attempts to exfiltrate data from the attacker’s 
suspected repository. Students who discover these artifacts gain much insight into the 
attacker’s actions. 
4. Transition Signals 
Should any one of the Training Lab log artifacts mentioned above be found, this 
could be (subjectively) considered sufficient evidence to make a determination that a 
CIRCE has occurred. Should a greater number of these log artifacts be found, their 
combined correlative effect creates a much more convincing transition signal. 
By searching the logs earlier in the Challenge Lab investigation, transition signals 
could come from uncovering several failed authorization attempts against the Georgia 
account. If the student then also discovers the newly created account, and that account’s 
attempt to access the more sensitive Executive-only objects, then he/she should discern 
even stronger evidence of CIRCE activity. Certainly, the discovery of script implantation 
should, by itself, exceed the incident threshold for most investigators. 
H. NETWORK CONNECTIONS 
1. Artifact Description 
Abnormal or unexpected connections could signal unauthorized remote access 
that requires further investigation. A skilled attacker will attempt to limit the time the 
connection is in use to prevent his/her own discovery. The combined effort to make a 
brief connection and to choose the most inconspicuous period to do so (for example, 
when no one is monitoring the system, or quite the opposite, during peak periods when 
there are many other connections to hide among), reduces the likelihood that first 
responders will notice such connections. 
This situation changes if network connection artifacts are also logged. Indeed, 
such logs make it trivial to review the connections post-facto. Nonetheless, this entails a 
number of requirements: the audit policy must have been on, the logs must not have been 
altered or deleted, and the attacker must not have convincingly impersonated a trusted 
connection during an acceptable hour or day (if applicable). 
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2. Investigation Tools 
Netstat is a built-in Windows command-line tool that is highlighted for use in 
both Labs. It is used to determine if any unexpected, live communication links are 
established with the local system. If the attacker is active during the investigation, this 
tool provides the remote connection origination IP address and port number associated 
with that connection. 
As previously stated, having a log of network connections provides a list of 
historical connections. This could also provide the source IP address and port number 
used by the attacker. Additionally, there should be a time or date and possibly duration 
associated with each connection. Logs provide the benefit of preserving volatile events, 
and remove the need to catch malicious connections serendipitously while active/live. 
3. Evaluation of the Indicators to Determine if Artifact Is Malicious  
Evaluating an incoming network connection requires information about its source 
IP address, the port numbers—source and destination--involved, when it took place, how 
long it lasted, and in some cases, what other system activity may have coincided with it. 
Should the suspicious connection be outgoing, the destination IP address becomes key. 
Should the source or destination address have a history of malicious activity, or be 
otherwise associated with an adversary, competitor, or other noteworthy entity; then the 
responder has a clear and strong indicator that the connection is malicious. Recognizing a 
suspicious address is a difficult task, unless an address is a repeat offender that has not 
(yet) been blocked. The aid of a database of known bad addresses would be indispensable 
in helping to decide this. 
There is a good likelihood that tracking down the original IP address of the 
attacker involves multiple steps. The path the suspicious connection took from the 
attacker’s system to the target system will involve multiple hops along multiple routers 
through the Internet. The attacker can also try to confuse or conceal his/her movement 
through cyberspace by designating which router his/her traffic will pass through. An 
attacker can use this behavior to conceal their identity or impersonate another. Other 
obstacles that help hide the attacker’s connection path could include the use of a Virtual 
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Private Network tunnel, or Onion Routing. The amount of time and work involved in 
identifying such path information is excessive for the investigator in a first responder 
role. Instead, this type of sleuthing work is more fitting for Phase 4 of the incident 
handling lifecycle.  
Port numbers have much more utility for the first responder than an unknown IP 
address. Resources abound that track malicious use of certain port numbers. All ports 
associated with numbers under 1024 are the so-called ‘well known’ ports. These ports are 
widely accepted as being associated with particular services. Knowing that a well-known 
port was used may instantly reveal the service to which the connection was intended. 
That is precisely the service that may have malicious code or a vulnerability for the 
attacker to exploit. Unlike the well-known ports, it is less obvious (clear) what service an 
attacker targets when using a random ephemeral port to establish the connection. Often, 
an ephemeral port is used when malware initiated an outbound connection, when opening 
the port is hardcoded into the malware, or when the port number was somehow sent to 
the attacker. Unless the port used is well-known or otherwise closely associated with a 
service, the first responder should pass it to follow-on investigators for future analysis. 
The VMs used were replete with a variety of ports known to be associated with malware. 
It is good for the students to notice this, though all open ports are not highlighted in the 
Labs. 
Finally, knowing the start and finish times of a connection helps the first 
responder in a couple ways. First, if a connection falls into an unusual period, it becomes 
correspondingly suspicious. Should the system never, or rarely, get remote connections 
when the business is closed, any such connection would clearly stick out and warrant 
further investigation. Even if there are no such downtimes, the connection period (start-
finish) should receive close attention, as this may be found to overlap with other artifacts 
associated with attacker activity.  
For the Training Lab, the storyline leads the student to suspect that a remote 
connection was used to create the suspicious admin account, pwnedU. This artifact is 
highly volatile: a connection must have been established at the time the tool was run in 
order to be observed by the tool. Due to the volatility of this artifact in our pre-captured 
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and recorded attack environment, the screenshot in Figure 4 is provided to the student so 
that he/she may see what the active connection would have looked like when using the 
netstat tool. The screenshot captures a moment in time coincident with the attacker’s 
network connection. 
 
Figure 4.  Network Connection Screenshot 
By contrast, the Challenge Lab does not overtly reveal the network connection 
used by the attacker. In a strict sense, this artifact went unused. There is; however, a good 
amount of connection-specific information in the Challenge lab logs. One of the scripts 
written for the Challenge lab writes to the logs each time the user logs on. It provides the 
following message as a system log warning, “A remote connect was successfully made 
with 196.254.33.45”. Even though the Challenge Lab is free-ranging, only a casual 
search through the logs is needed to discover that there were suspicious network 
connections made. 
4. Transition Signals 
A network connection may be the starting point and the best means of unveiling 
the origin and persona behind an attack. However, the investigation required to determine 
the persona behind a certain socket pair falls outside the first responder’s purview.  
Identification of the attacker is not the primary goal of the first responder, rather 
he/she should attempt to examine and report as many facets of the network connection as 
possible. This information includes, but is not limited to, IP addresses, ports, and services 
that are associated with the connection(s). This information can help the first responder 
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determine information that will help answer questions such as delivery vectors and 
system weaknesses. Specifics may also be leveraged to construct indicator-of-
compromise (IOC) rules that will catch similar attacker behavior in other portions of the 
enterprise. 
A straightforward case may be the result of an attacker who did not have the skill 
or opportunity to cover up his/her tracks. This could also signify he/she was attempting to 
divert the first responder from the primary interest/goal of the attacker. Trying to 
determine which is beyond the scope of a first responder. 
Nonetheless, to identify a malicious network connection is one way to prove a 
remote-access breach exists on the system. That alone signals a CIRCE and encompasses 
a major portion of the first responder’s duty. Prior to transition, the first responder should 
check if any other artifacts directly relate to the suspect connection. Trying to flush out 
the main aspects of an attack is suitable for the first responder; attempting to provide 
every detail is not. Delaying the report only delays the digital forensics team from 
starting. 
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IV. CONCLUSION  
A. SUMMARY 
As the Cyber Domain continues to grow in use and capabilities, well-trained 
cyber users are critical to maintaining the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
systems that are vital to mission success. This is especially true for DOD and other 
federal government employees who, in the Cyber Age, rely more and more on 
information technology to get the job done. 
The incident handling lifecycle outline in the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Manual 6501.01b provides foundational guidelines on how Department of Defense 
organizations should systemically approach cyber incidents. Each of the six phases 
outlined in the incident handling lifecycle help an organization develop and maintain 
healthy and secure information systems. The training developed in this research 
concentrated solely on the first and second stages of the lifecycle, which focus on 
detecting (Phase 1) and identifying (Phase 2) the signs that a Cyber Incident or 
Reportable Cyber Event, otherwise known as a CIRCE, has occurred or is occurring. 
The virtual training environments designed as part of this research could provide 
additional levels of cyber system awareness to any existing program-sponsored training. 
These types of virtual environments are unique training tools that can be easily built, 
installed, and modified to meet the specific training needed. As the training environments 
are further developed, these VMs can be configured to more closely reflect the system(s) 
the first responder will be assigned to. This can include, but is not limited to, designing 
the VM to match the operating system, network layout, antivirus, snort rules, etc. of the 
system the first responder will be assigned to protect. Furthermore, the training storyline 
can be easily modified to accommodate new scenarios that reflect nascent, real-world 
attacker activities, as described on front-page news sources. Each new scenario can 
provide additional experience for a responder to hone artifact analysis skills. The 
principles of basic WinOS artifact investigation contained in the two labs serve as an 
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entry-level debut for what is a long journey toward the development of a highly proficient 
cyber first responder or dedicated digital forensics analyst. 
The created virtual training environments aim at providing the student with a 
medium to perform live system analysis and gain tool-use experience. This research 
focused on introducing students to the eight categories/types of operating system artifacts 
he/she is most likely to encounter while performing a preliminary analysis of a WinOS 
machine that has exemplified odd/unusual behavior. The volatile artifacts are: Network 
Connections, Users Logged On, and Processes. The non-volatile artifacts are: Accounts, 
Files, Logs, Tasks, and the Registry.  
The VMs ran full-fledged operating systems peppered with artifacts from actual 
exploitations conducted within a controlled lab environment. In the end, a malicious 
persona taking actions on a system will leave artifacts behind. The ability of first 
responders to seek, identify and analyze these artifacts is invaluable for detecting 
evidence of a CIRCE, for making timely and accurate reports, and ultimately, for 
developing the correct response actions to eradicate the threat.  
B. FUTURE WORK 
1. Classroom and Individual Use Evaluations 
An in-classroom evaluation would provide good feedback to revamp and refine 
the labs provided. A study consisting of students with incident handling backgrounds 
from none to highly proficient would provide valuable feedback on how well the Lab and 
Virtual Environments can teach the desired skills. This should lead to improvements in 
the lab, which aim at creating a training aid detailed enough to teach a beginner, and 
challenging enough to provide refresher training to the more experienced incident 
handler. 
2. Initial Response Actions 
The work conducted in this research only touches lightly on the first two phases 
of the Incident Handling life cycle: Detection and Preliminary Analysis. It is very likely 
that a first responder will also be the individual tasked with implementing well-chosen 
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initial response actions that help to ensure the containment of any damage caused 
(realized), or likely to be caused (potential). This would transition the first responder out 
of Phase 2 and into Phase 3: Preliminary Response Actions. A compliment to the product 
of this thesis research would be follow-on lab-guided training concentrating on Phase 3 
goals and tactics. 
3. Development of Lab in a Game-Like Environment 
Development of the Challenge Lab into a more interactive game would add 
tremendous value to the training experience. The game would allow for the player to be 
involved in organization set up such as what equipment to use and what policies to put in 
place on software such as antivirus and firewalls. This would allow for development of a 
more realistic network with the potential of injecting or removing artifact based on the 
user’s actions. 
4. Mobile Application and Web Browser Artifacts 
The amount of available artifacts can differ from system to system and version to 
version. This research complied the type of system artifacts that are most commonly 
found across multiple platforms. However, these are by no means the only artifacts that 
are viable for first responder investigation. Given the evolving arsenal of user-friendly 
tools, a further study into common operating system artifacts and associated investigation 
tools that help develop the incident picture would be beneficial. For instance, in the world 
where Bring your Own Device (BYOD) is becoming a common business practice, a 
follow-on study of the effectiveness of these artifact in such an environment is would be 
beneficial. 
5. Employ Later Windows OS Versions in the Virtual Environment 
In time, the already aged Windows XP will be phased out of use by U.S. Naval 
systems. Creating VMs based on Windows 7, 8, 10, or later versions will eventually be 
needed to educate students about artifacts in use on those—current and future--systems. 
There is always a possibility a new class of artifact will arise with advances in OS and 
other programs.   
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APPENDIX A.  TRAINING LAB 
Artifact Investigation Training Lab  
Outline by LT Tye Wylkynsone, LT Simone Mims 
 
Lab Objectives: 
This lab will allow students to employ investigative techniques and methodology to 
analyze available artifacts. Students will learn to complete and submit a thorough 
incident report.  
 
Figure A1. 1CJCSM Incident Management Process Life cycle Model 
Discussion: 
 The Department of Defense Incident Handling process is broken into the six 
phases depicted in Figure 1. As an individual who may discover or be called upon to 
investigate a potential incident, a basic understanding of operating system artifacts and 
tools used to investigate them will help you be a more effective first responder. 
 
Upon detection of a suspicious event, the first responder should immediately move into 
the preliminary investigation phase, which includes but is not limited to searching for 
artifacts and querying users. During this phase, the investigator will determine if the 
event should be considered a reportable event or incident based on a standardized 
benchmark (6). Timely and concise reports ensure the information gets to the right people 
needed to defend and restore the system. 
 58 
 
Your role: Approach this lab from two perspectives. Start as an everyday user, then 
transition into your role as the Incident Responder (IR).  
 
Instructor role: I am the organization’s “Admin,” and I am your only POC for 
amplifying information.  
 
Amplifying information: For purposes of this lab, some volatile artifacts are simulated 
to give the student the opportunity to practice with the suggested tools. This will be 
clearly marked in the lab. 
 
Tasks:  
T1. Set up Virtual Environment 
 
1. Obtain a copy of the Training Lab from the instructor as an .ovf folder. 
2. Import this into the Virtual Machine software of your choice (e.g. VMWare 
Workstation or VirtualBox, etc.)  
3. Launch the VM. 
 
Both the everyday user and the Incident Responder should always have a detection-phase 
mindset. In order to recognize that something suspicious is taking place, every 
organization should have some written guidance and basic understanding of what normal 
looks like for their network.  
 
Q1. What are some good practices that should be in place on any network in order 
to ensure everyone in your IT organization understands what “normal” is and to allow 
proper detection to take place? 
 
A1. System backups, Written guidance to both users and sysadmins, Well-defined 
firewalls, antivirus systems, Intrusion detection/prevention systems, training on what 
users can do to prevent things like phishing and malicious downloads etc. Read-only 
tool kit that is not on the system a system. Written Incident Response Guidance, 
Defined First Responder tasking, saved system baseline information 
 
Besides good written policies and a robust backup plan, another good practice that should 
be in place in any organization is the development of an investigation tool kit. Since an 
attacker could manipulate tool names and functionality, a tool kit will ensure that known 
good applications are being used for investigation and will have no unintended effects on 
the system. 
According to CJCSM 6501.01b, event detection may occur in a number of ways. For 
instance, an automated detection system or sensor, a report from an individual or user, or 
an incident report or situational awareness update from other internal or external 
organizational components, such as USCYBERCOM, US-CERT, or external Computer 
Security Incident Response Team entities (CJCSM 6501.01B B-9). Review page B-9 and 
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B-10 of the CJCSM 6501.01b to see examples of suspicious cyber events and various 
ways they are detected.  
 
T2. Recognize the Initial Signs and Warnings.  
 
Figure A2. 2CJCSM Incident Management Process Life cycle Model  
Q2. Are there any changes to the login screen that appear unusual to you? What 
should your next action be? 
 
 A2. A new account has been created, pwnedU, we should contact our network 
administration team 
 
Now that suspicious behavior has been detected, move out of the detection phase (I) and 
into the preliminary investigation phase (II) of the CJCSM Incident Handling Life cycle 
model. Transition to the Incident Responder role here. 
One way a first responder can categorize artifacts is by their volatility. A prudent place to 
begin one’s investigation is to focus on those artifacts that have the shortest lifetime or 
duration: Volatile Artifacts. In this lab, the following artifacts are considered volatile: 
Network connections, Users currently logged on, Processes, and currently-scheduled 
Tasks. 
 
T3. Print the Reporting form on page 13–15 of this lab. Fill-in as much information as 
possible for the Cyber Incident Tracking Information and Reporting Information 
section of your report. 
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Appendix B to Enclosure C of the CJCSM 6510.01B provides a Cyber Incident 
Reporting format to utilize when making your initial report. This will be helpful in 
gathering and properly reporting the suspected incident or reportable event information. 
As mentioned above, your initial report is critical to getting the incident under control as 
quickly and efficiently as possible. Timeliness wins over completion here. Once the 
initial report has been made, analysis can continue and the report can be updated as more 
information becomes available. A well-formulated report will be as accurate and as 
succinct as possible. See page C-B-1 through C-B-5 of the CJCSM 6501.01b for a future 
guidance/explanation of what information is desired for each report block. 
 
 T4. Login to the Georgia account with the password “password” and begin 
investigation of available system volatile artifacts. Investigation tools have been 
suggested for quick analysis of each artifact however there are many other tools that 
could be used to gather information. If you have a tool you know better, feel free to use 
it. 
 
Accounts is a non-volatile artifact, but we begin with it because it was the first-
discovered type of artifact. 
 
A) Accounts 
  An account is a collection of permissions and settings. An operating system uses 
it to grant resources to personas who authenticate themselves correctly for a particular 
account. Should an attacker have physical access to a system, they may be able bypass 
the account system to gain illicit access to their target. However, it is far more likely that 
the attacker will attempt remote access to a system. The OS guards against any access not 
involving an account. 
T5. From the start menu open a command prompt, type the command net user to view all 
accounts on your system. 
 
Q3. What account listed requires further investigation? Describe what you find by 
a quick look at the account(s) properties and privileges. 
 
A3. PwnedU was created on 17AUG and is part of the Administrators group  
 
Further investigation of the suspicious account that we noticed at log-in, pwnedU, should 
have revealed that not only was this account recently created on the 17th of August but it 
is also part of the administrative group.  
B) Network Connections 
  At this point in the investigation, network connections are a good follow-on 
artifact. Abnormal or unexpected connections could signal unauthorized remote access 
that requires further investigation. In this case, you may suspect that a remote connection 
was used to create the suspicious admin account, pwnedU. This artifact is time-critical as 
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a connection must be established for you to see it. A skilled advisory will attempt to limit 
the time the connection is in use to prevent their own discovery. 
Netstat, a built-in Windows command-line tool, is one tool that could be used to 
determine if any unexpected communication links are established with your system. If the 
attacker was active at the time of your investigation, this tool will potentially help 
discover where the remote connection originates. 
 
T6. In the open command window, type the command netstat to view the active network 
connections. Since the connection has been terminated, you ought to see a blank output. 
Figure 3 captured the attacker’s active connection. Use this screenshot to answer the 
questions in this section. 
 
Figure A3. Active Network Connections  
Notice a TCP session is open (or ‘established’) with an IP address you are unfamiliar 
with. You may or may not recognize the port number in use. Do a quick Internet search 
to learn more about what this port is commonly used for. 
 
Q4. What is this port typically used for?  
 
      A4. W32.Blaster Worm and Trojan horses 
 
T7. In the open command prompt run fport.exe. Navigate to C:\Program 
Files\Toolkit\Fport-2.0 Once there, type the following command to run fport: Fport.exe. 
Your screen should look similar to the screenshot below.  
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Figure A4. IP Processes to Port Map  
 As you may have noticed, the suspicious port is not in the list as the remote 
connection is no longer active. However, there could be other ports here that give 
indications of how the system was compromised.  
Q5. What are some ports listed that you do not recognize? Do a little more 
research into these ports and their associated applications/paths. Write any 
observations below. 
 
A5. 445 used by System and slsmtp. The slsmtp has been shown to be 
commonly used for buffer overflow attacks (sever vulnerability) 138 used by 
FileZilla. File Zilla allows direct access to website servers via FTP. Malware may 
often camouflage itself as FileZilla.exe. 123 used by mysqld which is the MySQL 
server Daemon this port is often used to complete NTP attacks or control 
implanted trojans. 
 
An Internet search of some of these well-known (<1024) ports will reveal associations with 
SMB (server message block -445) and NetBIOSover TCP/IP (NTP -139), a mySQL 
daemon (-123), and suspect FileZilla activity (-138). All these open port present serious 







 The next artifact that could be investigated are the processes. A process is 
required by any action that demands resources and causes the OS to begin running 
through a set of instructions. This includes actions taken by an attacker. The trail created 
by these artifacts may reveal rogue or abnormal behavior. 
There are a few tools both resident to the WinOS and to your tool kit that will help in the 
analysis of processes. Tasklist and Autoruns, respectively, are utilized in this section. 
Feel free to branch out to other tools if you know them. Always keeping in mind having 
as light a touch as possible. 
 
Immediately upon logging in, you ran the tasklist command to see what processes were 
running. The screenshot below is what you saw. The goal of looking at the list of running 
processes is to recognize if any running processes are out of the ordinary. This means you 
must understand what is normal for this system and the user. Useful information could 
also be gained from asking the user what they were doing during the suspected infection 
time and removing the known good processes from the list. In this case, you have asked 
the user who reported that they had an Internet browser window, WordPad and Windows 
messenger open.  
 
Figure A5. Running Process  
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T8. From the command prompt line, type in tasklist/svc to display all running processes. 
Compare what you see now with what you saw when you first ran the command as well 
as with the information provided by the user. 
 
Q6. Based on the Figure 5 list and what was discovered from the fport results, do 
you see any processes that could be suspicious? 
 
      A6. notepad, SLadmin.exe, SLsmtp.exe , mysqld.exe , fileZIlla 
 
Any process related to (or matching the name of) one of the suspect programs utilizing a 
port mentioned in A5 is a noteworthy artifact. Further investigation of these processes 
can be conducted with ProcMon, a SysInternals tool for passively monitoring process 
activity on windows systems.  
 
T9. From the command prompt, navigate to C:\Program Files\Toolkit\SysInternals 
Suite. Type ProcMon and hit <enter.> Below is a process tree (available under the Tools 
menu) containing volatile information. 
 
Figure A6. Process Tree View in PROCMON 3.1  
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The First Responder’s Guide to Computer Forensics: Advanced Topics provides 19 
checks to conduct that could be useful in helping you identify if the legitimacy of 
processes (Nolan et al., 2005).  
T10. Run the suspicious process (Slsmtp) in A6 through the 19 checks listed below. 
Make this a brief mental exercise as data may unavailable for answering some of these 
questions. Note: PROCMON is useful to answer most of the questions. There are 
multiple correct answers to the questions below. Suggested answers are provided.  
 
 
 Q7. Determine if these processes were legitimate or rogue. Could it be malicious? 
 
 A7. Any process cited in A5 will turn up a port known for malicious activity. So, 
that answer carries over to here. Also, researching these ports and the answers in A6 all 
answer Q1: names that match known malware or exploitable programs. However, the 
Fig. 6 shows Notepad.exe with two running instances, both owned by the System 
(Q7). These were not scheduled nor were they used by Georgia, but by 
the attacker impersonating ‘System.’ 
 
Process questions 7 and 15 highlight how some children of 1020 have been started by the 
System, not the user. Yet the user has not employed that program and it was not a 
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scheduled task either. Also, question 11 has already been used (during Q6) for all the 
programs that opened ports known for their malicious activity. 
D) Users currently logged on 
 It is a good idea to check which users are currently logged on to the system. It is 
possible that our attacker is currently logged on.  
T11. From the command line, navigate to C:\Program Files\Tool kit/SysInternals Suite 
Type the following command to view users currently logged on: psloggedon.exe and hit 
<enter.> 
 
 Q8. Which users are currently logged on? 
 
 A8. Georgia and today’s timestamp 
 
It is possible that not every artifact will provide you with a smoking gun signifying clear 
intruder behavior. Do not get stuck trying to make evidence appear. Remember this is the 
preliminary investigation phase and your goal is to provide as clear and timely a report as 
possible.  
 
E) Scheduled Tasks 
 The attacker may have set up malicious activity to be triggered by some event. 
Scheduled Tasks represent one overt way of doing this. These tasks are orders to the OS 
to run a chosen program in conjunction with a selected event. Any artifact left here by an 
attacker may indicate one of their goals for exploiting the system. 
 
T12. From the open command prompt, ensure you are still in your toolkit folder and type 
autoruns.exe. Once the application opens, click on the scheduled task tab to view any 
current or future scheduled task. This information can also be listed from the command 
line with the schtasks. Try these methods and answer the question below. 
 
 Q9. What suspicious tasks are currently scheduled? Give as much detail about the 
scheduled task(s) as possible. [Right click any scheduled task that requires further 
investigation and select Jump to Entry. This will pull up this scheduled task in the 
Windows Task Scheduler GUI. Once you are in the Windows Task Scheduler, right-click 
and select properties to learn more about that task.] 
 
 A9. LaunchTrojan.job set to launch an .exe file called BadRat, itself set to run at a 
specific date in the file and delete the task once it has run. 
 
You now have discovered evidence that an incident has occurred. In accordance with 
your role as preliminary investigator, it is important to report the incident and what 
information you have gathered. Remember you are in the preliminary analysis of the 
investigation phase and should not search exhaustively for evidence after you have 
determined a reportable event or incident has occurred. For the purposes of the lab, 
continue investigating other artifacts. 
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T13. Update the CJCSM report. Use the information you gathered in Task 1–10 to fill in 
the following blocks of your report: Primary incident category, delivery vector, source 
IP(s) and ports, Target IP and ports, Method of Detection. 
 
Preliminary investigation of the volatile artifacts is now complete and you should move 
on to the nonvolatile artifacts. Artifacts which fall into the nonvolatile category are: 
Accounts, Logs, files, and registries.  
 
F) Logs 
 There are numerous logs that are recorded on a host machine daily. Each can be a 
great tool for rebuilding the story of what took place during a suspected incident. Based 
on how the logs in your system are configured, there could be hundreds of thousands of 
logged events to sift through. Utilizing what information was gathered about the incident 
so far, an attempt can be made to scope the incident and focus your investigation of the 
logs into a particular time period. Unusual or missing logged events can also be great 
indicators of where you should look next.  
 
 Q10. What are some basic logs that are available on virtually all systems that 
should be examined during the preliminary investigation phase? 
 
 A10. Security, System, Application 
 
 Q11. What are 5 good activities to look for while investigating logs?  
 
 A11. Failed log-on attempts, started or stopped services, remote connections, 
created or deleted accounts, started or stopped processes. 
 
T14. Launch the Windows Event Viewer by typing eventvwr.msc into a command 
prompt window. Navigate to each of those core logs you entered in A10 above. 
PSloglist is a SysInternal Suite command line tool that allows you to view log data in a 
human-readable output or to dump logs into a plaintext (Excel) file for a searchable 
review capability.  
 
T15. From the command prompt window, navigate to C:\Program Files\Tool 
Kit\SysInternals Suite and type the desired PSloglist command to continue your log 
investigation. Use this website to learn more about using this tool: 
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psloglist  
Pay special attention to any of the helpful events you listed above or that you may have 
heard in class. These should include successful and failed logon attempts, 
creating/stopping/starting services, usage of suspicious applications, changes to account 
and security settings, changes to user permissions, and Event IDs.  
  
 Q12. What useful information did you identify in the logs based on the 
information you have gathered in your investigation so far? Write below what you found 
and where you found it. 
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  A12. When pwnedU was created (17AUG17) there is much activity by SLadmin. 
Multiple errors can be found though none seem out of the normal. Also, if you investigate 
the 7035 Event ID from 2017 from the dates around pwnedU creation, you will find the 
starting of the remote connection manager this may be a great way to develop a timeline 
of the attacker’s presence on the system. (Answers may vary here; the point here to get 
the student looking through the logs and filtering out any behavior that could help their 
investigation.) 
 
Because so many events are logged on daily basis, it is important to filter the logs with 
the information you have already learned. This will direct you to the most useful portion 
of the logs. In this case, you know a few things already: You have identified some 
suspect, running programs; you know an account was created; you suspect this account 
was created through a remote connection (service was started) and you know when that 
account was created, August 17th. Use this date and program information to focus your 
investigation and look at logs that are a month before and a few months after this date 
and logs associated with the suspicious programs. 
 
Once you have determined a likely timeframe for the incident, select the log you want to 
view and further filter the list by selecting View on the menu bar and Filter Current log. 
Here you will be able to filter out unnecessary information to help narrow down your 
search. Some available filters are: Time filter, Event Source, Event ID, Task Category, 
Keywords, User, and Computers. Make sure to clear any filters you may have set as you 
move between logs by returning to the View menu and selecting All Records. A 
description of how to set each desired filter can be found at: 
https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc722058(v=ws.11).aspx. 
 
It is also important to note that a blank log can also be a red flag and an indication that 
the attacker may have been trying to cover-up his or her tracks. For instance, you may 
have noticed that the security logs are blank. Account logon events, Account 
management, policy changes, object access, successful or failed network connections, 
and privilege use, are a few of the events logged in the Security logs that could be helpful 
in rebuilding the attacker’s story. 
 
G) Files  
Files are the means to store data for a computer or information system. When an attacker 
creates a file on your system (or uploads it), there is a high likelihood it has a malicious 
purpose. A file also becomes an artifact when an attacker leaves any trace on it. Perhaps 
they stole information, read sensitive data, or, or embedded an alternate data stream into a 
file. A file integrity management system is a great way to check for changes to your 
system, including files. Linux-based systems allow you to use programs such as AIDE 
and TripWire, which make use of a known good previous image to compare changes. A 
very basic approach to investigating a Windows file is to view the file properties. 
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 Q13. By looking over the various files located anywhere in Georgia’s computer, 
how many are there? 
 A13: 30920 
 
If you are stuck here, try a simple windows search for files on the C:// drive. 
 
 Q14. Looking over the C-M-A timestamps for these files, are there some that are 
contemporary to the attacker’s activity on the system? Or when the user was logged on?  
 
 A14: Date of badRAT file precedes creation of the unknown account by a week, 
so the attacker exploited the system by 10AUG17 or earlier. 
 
As Q13 shows, there are over 30,000 files on the system. Use the information that you 
know about the most likely dates the attacker may have been on the system. Start 
investigating any files created or changed around that date. If you have the reporting user 
on hand, you can ask them about some of the candidates you turned up. Recall Georgia 
previously had not stated anything about working with Notepad. 
 
 Q15. What suspicious text files were found? 
 
 A15: BadRat.txt located in the system32 folder not a normal location for a .txt 
file. 
 
You may have noticed that the suspicious .txt file was hidden in an unusual location for 
text files. This is likely the attacker’s attempt to hide his actions. Now you have an 
ominously-named file, possibly created by a program that was not being used by Georgia. 
Tampering with such a file risks detonating it --- with unknown consequences. Leave that 
for the data forensics lab. 
 
The SysInternals package provides some noteworthy tools for file investigation. ‘Strings’ 
looks for suspicious characters in files. ‘Streams’ checks for alternate data streams and 
provides a means for deleting them. ‘PsFiles’ shows all files opened remotely. 
 
T16. Try using some of these commands to become familiar with potential output results. 
Run these programs from the command line as an administrator: 
“streams *” 
“strings -u -q Executable_name.exe | sort” Where –u is Unicode and –q is quiet 
mode. Select a file of interest. 
“Psfile” 
 
 Q16: What output was provided? What information could be gained from these 
commands/tools? 
 
 A16:  0 files will be found (Take the opportunity to evaluate the different types of 




Registries are sets of values (known as configurations) that an Operating System requires 
for proper functioning. These values pertain to the system and for each user. This artifact 
should be investigated with caution as perturbing these values could cause user or system 
malfunction or breakdown. 
The Registry database is broken into five major hives, or files, located at: 
 %SYSTEMROOT%\system32\config and two user-specific hives located at the user’s 
profile directory 
 
T17. From the command prompt window, navigate to c:\Windows\system32\config and 
type dir <enter> to list the contents of the folder. 
 Q17. What are these five hives called? You may also find this information in the 
regedit application by expanding the HKEY_Local_Machine folder. To open this 
program, click the start menu’s run, enter regedit and press <enter.> 
 
 A17. SAM, Default/Hardware, Security, Software, System 
 
Native to the windows systems are both a command-line and GUI interface tool. Both 
can be used to view, query, and modify registries. The repository of information on usage 
of the system and applications is extensive. They could readily expose an exploitation to 
a (highly) knowledgeable technician. Through examination of the registries’ repositories, 
an investigator may be able to gain information such as the last actions taken by a 
specific user on the system, which programs are set to auto-run, running applications, and 
hardware configurations. Any unusual findings may indicate malicious activity took 
place. 
One place to begin your investigation of registries is the Auto start keys. These deal with 
programs that run during the startup of the system. Autorun.exe is a great tool for quick 
investigation of the auto-run Registry Keys. Here we will look at three different keys, the 
Run, RunOnce and WinLogon Userinit keys. 
T18. From the command prompt enter any of the following commands for a quick view 
of each auto-run registry: (make sure your command prompt looks like C:\>) 
C:\> reg query 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\<Runonce, 
Run, RunonceEX> 
Ex. reg query HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run 
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For more information, utilize SysInternals tool ‘autorun.’ Once the application is 
launched, click on the tab labeled “Everything” to view the registry data. Look for the 
following three AutoRun Entries: 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Current Version\Run 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Current Version\RunOnce 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Current Version\Winlogon\Userinit  
Ctrl+F can also be used to quickly locate entries with the keys words seen at the end of 
each entry above.  
Further investigation can be done into these entries by right-clicking the description listed 
under the AutoRun Entry and selecting Jump to Entry to open windows registry editor. 
Or, Jump to Image will open the folder location of the file linked to a task. Include any 
information discovered in your answer below. 
 Q18. What suspicious entries, if any, did you find in these three registry 
locations?  
 
 A18. Though nothing particularly stands out during this search, the point is to get 
the students digging in the Registry in likely locations to look for traces of malicious 
behavior. 
 
Attacker behavior may not always be plainly noticeable or any different than what you 
would expect to see in the registry for normal system operations. If nothing suspicious 
readily jumps out at you, remember you are in the pre-analysis phase. Realize that further 
analysis will still be conducted during phase IV of the Incident Handling process model.  
T19. Complete CJCSM report. 
Utilizing what you have learned in class, as well as the information gather from your 
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APPENDIX B.  TRAINING LAB REPORT 
Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 1 of 3) 
Reference pdf p.77 of document for guidance in filling in the report  
Field  Description  
Cyber Incident Tracking Information  
Reporting Incident 
Number  786238  
Organizational Tracking  NPS GZ35012  
Incident Investigator 
Assigned  PUT YOUR NAME HERE:  
Reporting Information  
Name  REPORTING USER  
Organization  FNMOC  
Telephone  555-3874  
Email  user@nps.edu  
Fax  N/A (not applicable or not available)  
Alternative Contact  jdfulp@nps.edu  
Categorization Information  
Primary Incident 
Category  Root User Intrusion  
Secondary Incident 
Category    
Delivery Vector(s)  
 
Trojan or Buffer overflow exploit on port 445 to SLsmtp.exe  
  
System Weaknesses  
  
  
Seattle Labs vulnerabilities are very old and well-known, leaving us 
open to an attacker. 
User account with too much privilege 
There may be a number of implants or other vulnerabilities placed 
on the system as a result of this intrusion.  
Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 2 of 3) 
Reference pdf p.77 of document for guidance in filling in the report  
Field  Description  
Incident Status  
Status  Incident determined … Response and Forensics needed.  
Incident Start Date  17AUG17  
Incident End Date  25SEP17 --- and ongoing.  
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Last Update   <assume this is date of the assigned lab in course syllabus>  
Date Reported  25SEP17  
System Classification  UNCLASS  
Action Taken  
  
 
Preliminary investigation uncovered several indications of Root 
Intrusion and system exploits stemming from it. Quarantine of 
affected machines to allow for further deep investigation.  




Buffer overflow exploit on port 445 to SLsmtp.exe  
  
Root Cause(s)  
  
Seattle Labs vulnerabilities are very old and well-known, leaving us 
open to an attacker. Georgia’s account was hacked and the attacker 
gained Admin access. Extent of exploit needs urgent investigation.  
Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 3 of 3) 
Reference pdf p.77 of document for guidance in filling in the report  
Field  Description  
Source IP(s) & Port(s)  
  
162.255.177.177 ports 4444 and 445  
Intruder(s) (if known)  
  
pwnedU and whomever controls above source IP.  
Origin (Country)  USA 
Target IP(s) & Port(s)  
  
Local. Bookxp:1036  
Technique, Tool, or 
Exploit Used  
 
Remote exploit of a buffer overflow to gain full access to our 
system. Possible Malware was installed and other vulnerabilities 
may have been created.  
Operating System (OS) 
and OS Version Windows XP Pro  
Use of Target (e.g., Web 
Server, File Server, Host)  Terminal for SysAdmins, specifically Georgia.  
Method of [original] 
Detection  
  
User discovered unusual account.  
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Sites Involved  
Company/Organization  FNMOC  
Physical Location Naval Research labs, Monterey, CA  
Network(s) bookxp  
Detecting Unit or 
Organization  Local IT at FNMOC and NPS ITACS.  
Affected Unit or 
Organization  Entire FNMOC, possibly others.  
Impact Assessment  
Systems Affected  UCLASS network at FNMOC  
Operational Impact  
  
Unknown.  
Technical Impact  
  
System may have numerous vulnerabilities added from this 
intrusion.  
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APPENDIX C.  CHALLENGE LAB 
Artifact Investigation Challenge Lab 
Outline by Tye Wylkynsone, LT Simone Mims 
 
 
Lab Objectives: This lab will allow students to employ investigative techniques and 
methodology to analyze available artifacts. This lab is meant to build on skills learned 
through completion of the Training Lab. Students will learn to complete and submit a 
thorough incident report.  
 
Discussion: Detection of suspicious events can occur in multiple ways. Three methods 
outlined in the CJCSM 6501.01B are: 
1. An automated detection system or sensor. 
2. A report from an individual or user. 
3. An incident report or situational awareness update from other internal or 
external organizational components, such as USCYBERCOM or US-CERT. 
Recall from the Training lab that a responsible system user is always in the 
mindset of a detector. The detector is defined in the CJCSM 6501.01B as the individual 
who observe an event or incident. The detector should be trained to step away from the 
effected system and call for the organizations designated first responder. This will help to 
prevent damage or contamination of evidence. Once the first responder is on-scene 
triaging of the suspected event should occur as quickly and efficiently as possible. Good 
documentation and note taking will be key to successful completion of this lab. Some 
suggested notetaking templates are provided in the aids section of this lab. This lab is 
designed to build on what you learned the Training Lab. The “Company Network” has 
been built up to add more realism to the training. 
 
Your role: You are entering work on a Monday after a well-deserved vacation. 
Remember to always be in the mode of the detector. Once a suspected CIRCE (Cyber 
Incident or Reportable Cyber Event) is detected, transition to the role of The Company’s 
first responder. Analysis Checklist and Aid have been included at the end of this lab to 
help organize your investigation efforts. 
 
Instructor role: I am the organization's "Immediate Superior", and I am your only POC 
for amplifying information.  
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THE COMPANY 




T1. Set up Virtual Environment 
 
 1. Obtain a copy of the Challenge Lab VM from the instructor as an .ovf folder. 
 2. Import this into the Virtual Machine software of your choice (e.g. VMWare 
Workstation or VirtualBox, etc.)  
 3. Launch the VM. 
 
T2. Log in as any member listed in the organization chart as a member of the 
Engineering group.  Passwords for any account is the username spelled backwards.  
Example: username: Wisconsin password: nisnocsiw 
 
Q1. Which account did you sign in as? What are the account properties? (Groups, 




Normal business can and should still occur simultaneously with the detector 
responsibilities. This also includes ensuring good security practices. Such as verifying 
your password is up-to-date and you are in accordance with company policies.  This also 
includes acknowledging (i.e. press enter) all security or antivirus alerts and immediately 
reporting them to your SysAdmin or designated first responder. 
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T3. Check your outlook email box to see any new tasking orders. Navigate to the 
company share drive (Shared Documents) and review the System Use guidelines 
(Business Guidelines folder).  While there, take note of what folders you can and cannot 
access based on your user accounts position in the organization. 
 
In the process of going about your normal daily routine. You notice your computer is 
running a little slower than normal. 
 
T4. Open a command prompt window and run the tasklist command. Note the processes 
that are currently running and list a few in the space provided below. 
 
Running Processes: 




T5. From the command prompt run the net user command and take note of how many 
accounts are available on the system. List the accounts below. 
 
____________________ ____________________ ____________________       
____________ 
 
____________________ ____________________ ____________________       
____________ 
 
____________________ ____________________ ____________________       
____________ 
 
T6. Log out of the account you are currently logged in as and Log into one of the 
Executive accounts.   
 
T7. Remember to note anything you feel is suspicious and if you suspect a CIRCE 
transition to the role of First Responder. An Artifact Investigation Aid is provided to 
assist in your analysis. Utilize the Cyber reporting form from the Training Lab to report 
your finding. When you feel you have filled out the report with enough information to 
inform your chain of command of what has occurred, complete the report and forward on 
to your Immediate Superior (i.e., the instructor). Note: Utilize no less than two artifacts to 
support your report claims. 
 
Q2. What suspected CIRCE triggers you to transition to the first responder role? Give as 
much detail as possible about the suspected CIRCE. (This information can also be 







CIRCE Determination Checklist (answer what questions you can to help determine if 
the suspected event should be considered a CIRCE) 
 


















2. Status (ongoing or ended; successful or unsuccessful). 
____________________________ 
3. Number of ISs affected. ___________ 
4. Source and destination Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. 
_________________________ 




7. IS location. 
____________________________________________________________ 




























Artifact Investigation Aid 
Artifact (Sug.) Investigation Tool First Responder Notes 
Process 
Note: see checklist 2 
 
Windows Command (arg): tasklist 
(/svc) 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: PROCMON 
 
Users Logged on 
Windows Command (arg):  
 




Windows Command (arg):  
WinOS Search function 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: 
 
Network 
Connections Windows Command (arg): netstat 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: 
 
Task (Scheduled) Windows Command (arg): schtasks 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: autoruns.exe 
 
Accounts Windows Command (arg): net user 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: 
 
Logs 
Windows Command (arg): 
eventvwr.msc 
 
SysInternals Suite tool: PSloglist 
 
Registries 
Windows Command (arg): reg, 
regedit.exe 
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APPENDIX D.  CHALLENGE LAB REPORT 
Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 1 of 3)       
Reference pdf p.77 of document for guidance in filling in the report 
Field Description 
Cyber Incident Tracking Information 
Reporting Incident 
Number  786239  
Organizational 
Tracking  NPS GZ35013  
Incident Investigator 
Assigned  PUT YOUR NAME HERE:  
Reporting Information  
Name  REPORTING USER  
Organization  The Company  
Telephone  555-3874  
Email  user@nps.edu  
Fax  N/A (not applicable or not available)  
Alternative Contact  jdfulp@nps.edu  
Categorization Information  
Primary Incident 
Category  Root User Intrusion  
Secondary Incident 
Category   Malicious Logic or Non Compliance Activity 
Delivery Vector(s)  
 
Trojan or Buffer overflow exploit on port 445 to SLsmtp.exe 
System Weaknesses  
   
Seattle Labs vulnerabilities are very old and well-known, leaving 
us open to an attacker.  Poorly named files in file system 
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User account with too much privilege 
There may be a number of implants or other vulnerabilities placed 
on the system as a result of this intrusion.  
Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 2 of 3)             




Incident Start Date 6DEC17 
Incident End Date  
Last Update  <assume this is date of the assigned lab in course syllabus> 
Date Reported Today’s Date 









Preliminary Investigation of Logs and File system utilizing 
Windows Event Manager and File Search function respectively 
revealed newly created privileged account and newly created files 
and remote connections not initiated by the user.  
Recommendations have been made to take the disable reporting 










Multiple user reports of request to change password messages.  
Users in the Executive Group reported multiple security alerts 







Poor passwords and incorrect account types which allowed the 
attacker to utilize the buffer overflow vulnerability to get into the 
network. 
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Modified version of Table C-B-1 from CJCSM 6510.01B (page 3 of 3)       
Reference pdf p.77 of document for guidance in filling in the report 
Field Description 
Source IP(s) & Port(s) 
 196.254.33.45 
Intruder(s) (if known) 
  
Origin (Country) Source is Link Local address 
Target IP(s) & Port(s) 
 169.255.197.17 
Technique, Tool, or 
Exploit Used  
Remote exploit of a buffer overflow to gain full access to our 
system. Possible Malware was installed and other 
vulnerabilities may have been created.  
Operating System (OS) and 
OS Version Windows XP Pro  
Use of Target (e.g., Web 
Server, File Server, Host)  Terminal for SysAdmins, specifically Georgia.  
Method of [original] 
Detection   Security and Antivirus Alerts.  
Sites Involved  
Company/Organization  The Company  
Physical Location   Monterey, CA  
Network(s)   bookxp  
Detecting Unit or 
Organization  Local IT  
Affected Unit or 
Organization  The Company, possibly others.  
Impact Assessment  
Systems Affected  UCLASS network  
Operational Impact  Loss of Confidentially of Company Secrets and R&D results. 
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Technical Impact  
  
System may have numerous vulnerabilities added from this 
intrusion. Password Security and Experimental data Results 
are Compromised 
The last eight entries in the original format were removed from this version as they are not germane to this 
exercise 
A. ATTACKER’S STORYLINE 
The attacker’s ultimate goal was to collect as many passwords as possible through an 
installed key logger and steal/exfiltrate company experimentation results located on the 
company share drive. The Attacker installed a dummy script to distract the system users 
from the scripts that are accomplishing the goals outlined above. 
 
B. ACTIONS BY ARTIFACT 
Processes: Script is implanted, which opens and closes the calculator program 300 times. 
This triggers an alert message to be displayed to the student. The alert message reads as 
follows: “Malicious activity has been detected.” If the student utilizes PROCMON before 
the script stops, they will see a process tree that has the calculator program as a child of 
wscript who is a child of the explorer.exe. This should be considered suspect as only the 
system administrator is allowed to run scripts on the system. Because this script is in the 
start-up folder, it will run every time the student logs onto the system. This is meant to 
demonstrate malware persistence.  
 
Files: Script named FindCopy is implanted in the startup folder of both executive 
members. This script runs in conjunction with the calculator open-close script described 
above. The two run simultaneously in hopes that the very visible calculator behavior will 
distract users from the actions of the find and copy script. FindCopy finds the folder 
containing the company experimental data results and simulates reading and coping the 
data contained in these files to a new file which is created in the created by the adversary. 
A keylogger has also been implanted to steal account passwords. Each time the keylogger 
runs, a file is created in the attacker’s folder to hold that password. An investigation into 
times that files were created and by whom will reveal that at least two folders were 
recently created by the signed in user (suspicious because the user did not report creating 
folders). There will also be evidence that information has been added to these folders. 
 
Logs: Logs are replete with data for the student to filter and analyze. In the security logs, 
the student can find evidence of the Massachussets [sic] creation, as well as its privilege 
escalation and addition to the executive group. Time scoping will also reveal that the 
Georgia admin account has multiple failed login attempts and then a successful login 
right before the Massachussets [sic] account was created. A log entry is also made to the 
system log each time the find and copy script runs. The description of the event reveals 
 93 
what ip address the supposed remote connect is established with and signifies to the 
student that a file transfer has occurred. 
 
Registries/Accounts: In the HKLM Run key, a script has been added to the key value. 
This script runs when any user logs in and its goal is to delete the attacker’s account 
(Massachussets [sic]). When students log out of the standard user and into the executive 
account or run the command net user, they should notice that the Massachussets [sic] 
account has disappeared. This happens without anyone taking action to delete it. 
 
Users logged on: Use of the SysInternal tool psloggedon.exe will reveal that there are 
other users logged on to the system. However, this information does not advance the 
analysis. 
 
Network Connection: N/A 
 
Task Scheduled: Students may feel the need to review scheduled tasks, as there is a 
process running that was not user-executed. However, there are no tasks scheduled with 
this GUI. Students must investigate the registry with regedit tool or the windows start-up 
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